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About a dozen developing countries have deposit  Deposit insurance also tends to be a more
insurance systems and several others are consid-  expensive mechanism for protecting depositors
ering establishing them. These systems are  because it offers less freedom of action to
typically created to prevent contagious bank  policymakers than an implicit scheme. Finally,
runs, to provide a formal national mechanism for  developing countries often do not adequately
handling failing banks, and to protect small  fund their deposit insurance schemes.  As a
depositors frcm losses when banks fail.  result, the systems often lack credibility in the
marketplace and bank supervisors may be unable
Without a deposit insurance system, many  to close insolvent banks because the insurer
developing nations in recent years have extended  would be unable tc pay off insured depositors.
implicit deposit protection to depositors on a
discretionary, ad hoc basis.  Deposit insurance systems are relatively
complex mechanisms that must be designed
Deposit insurance systems have several  properly to be effective. They generally function
advantages over these implicit protection  best if they are public, if they are adequately
schemes.  Deposit insurance probably gives the  funded and have government backup support in a
bankirng  system more protection against bank  crisis, if bank membership is compulsory, if
runs, provides more protection for small deposi-  deposits are not fully insured, and if the insurer
tors, and - by replacing discretion with rules-  can resolve bank failures in a variety of ways.
provides a faster, smoother, more consistent
administrative process.  Deposit insurance systems are no substitute
for effective bank supervision in maintaining a
On the other hand, deposit insurance prob-  stable banking system. Moreover, they are likely
ably creates more moral hazard for depositors,  to founder sooner or later without effective bank
thereby contributing to the erosion of market  supervision.
discipline and increased bank risk-taking.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal
AffairsComplex. An objective of theseries is to get these findings outquickly, even if presentations areless than fuly polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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During  the 1980s,  banking  instability  has emerged  as a major  problem  in
both  developed  and developing  countries. In response,  governmuents  in  many  of
these  countries  have taken  strong  actions  to restore  their  banking  systems  to
health  and  strengthen  their  prudential  regulation.
There are a variety  of reasons  why governments  want to have a stable
banking  system. One  reason  is to avoid  a breakdown  in the  nation's  payments
system,  which in large  part is administered  by the banking  system.  Such a
breakdown  could  seriously  impair  economic  activity  and,  in  extreme  cases,  could
force  a  nation  into  some  form  of  barter  with  all  of  the  inefficiencies  that  such
systems  entail. A second  reason  is to increase  the  nation's  savings  rate  by
providing  people  with  a  safe  financial  asset  (bank  deposits)  that  they  can  hold.
By increasing  savings,  a nation  can  have  more investment  and achieve  a  higher
rate  of  economic  growth. Third,  maintaining  a  sound  banking  system  promotes  the
development  and  growth  of  financial  intermediation.  It  is  generally  acknowledged
that  financial  intermediation  tends  to  produce  a more  efficient  allocation  of
credit  and  resources  in  a  nation  than  if  financial  transactions  are  carried  out
directly  between  surplus  and  deficit  units. Finally,  for  social  welfare  reasons,
governments  often  want  to  protect  small  depositors  from  losses  in  bank  failures
that  could  wipe  out  a sizable  portion  of their  life  savings.
In  order  to  achieve  banking  stability,  governments  have  developed  a  variety
of institutional  arrangements  that  tend  to  promote  stability.  High  on the  list
are  banking  laws  and  regulations  that  set  the  ground  rules  for  bank  operations.
An important  objective  of these  laws  and  regulations  is to  constrain  bank  risk
taking. This is accomplished  by designating  the types  of activities  in  which
banks  can  engage,  the  types  of loans  and  investments  that  banks  can  make,  and
the  amount  of capital  that  banks  must  maintain. Banking  laws  and regulations2
also  are  designed  to  prevent  inaider  dealings  and  fraud  by  bank  management.  In
addition to establishing  a  legal framework  for banking, governments  have
established  systems  for supervising  and examining  banks.  These systems  are
designed  to  assure  bank  compliance  with  laws  and  regulations  and  to  prevent  banks
from  engaging  in  unsound  banking  practices.  Finally,  governments  have  authorized
their  Central  Bank  to  lend  to  individual  banks  experiencing  liquidity  pressures.
By  acting  as  a lender  of  last  resort,  the  Central  Bank  can  shield  illiquid  banks
from  having  to  sell  assets  at  depressed  prices  in  a  disorderly  market. In  doing
so, the Central  Bank can prevent  bank liquidity  problems  from turning  into
insolvencies.
Despite  past  government  efforts  to  promote  banking  stability,  the  banking
systems  of many developing  countries  have experienced  serious  distress  during
the  past  decade. Indeed,  the  distress  in  some  of  these  countries  appears  to  have
reached  levels  that  are  unprecedented  during  the  last  50  years. The  causes  of
this  distress  are  numerous. One  major  factor  has  been  the  severe  macroeconomic
shocks  that  most  developing  nations  have  sustained.  In  many  of  these  countries,
these  exogenous  shocks  have  been  exacerbated  by inappropriate  domestic  economic
policies,  particularly  large  budget  deficits  and  excessive  growth  of  money  and
credit. The resulting  economic  dislocations  have  had serious  adverse  effects
on  the  profits  of  many  domestic  firms,  thereby  impairing  their  ability  to  service
their  bank debt.  As a result,  banks in some developing  countries  now have
extremely  high levels  of nonperforming  loans  that sometimes  exceed  50  percent
of their  loan  portfolio  and  several  times  their  capital  and  reserves.
Banks in many countries  also have been harmed  by various government
policies that reduce bank profits.  These policies include  high reserve
requirements on  which  little  or no interest  is  paid,  laws  that  force  banks  to3
allocate  a  portion  of  their  lending  to  firms  and  sectors  of the  economy  that  are
unprofitable,  and  requirements  that  force  the  banks  to maintain  branch  offices
in areas  of the  country  where  banks  would  not choose  to operate  voluntarily.
Finally,  many  banks in  developing  countries  have been  crippled  by incompetent
management  or  managers  who  have  used  the  bank  to further  their  own  interests.
The  distressed  condition  of  banks  in  some  developing  countries  has  raised
the  possibility  of  widespread  bank  runs  and  the  collapse  of the  banking  system.
In response  to this  prospect,  more  than  25  governments  in  the  past  decade  have
intervened  to  help distressed  institutions.  The following  three  cases  give  a
taste  of the  extent  of the  distress  that  had to  be confronted  and the  actions
that  the  government  felt  compelled  to  take.  X
In the early 1980s, the  financial  system in Chile had  widespread
insolvencies.  As a result,  the government  in 1981 intervened  and liquidated
eight  insolvent  institutions  that,  in  aggregate,  held  35  percent  of  the  financial
system's  total  assets. A little  over  a year  later,  the  government  intervened
again,  placing  eight  institutions  with  45 percent  of the  system's  assets  under
the  management  of the  Central  Bank,  and  extended  financial  support  to all  but
one  of  the  remaining  commercial  banks. As  a  result  of  these  actions,  the  Central
Bank's  holdings  of  nonperforming  commercial  bank  loans  as late  as  1988  amounted
to  nearly  19  percent  of the  nation's  gross  national  product.
In  Colombia,  losses  of  the  banking  system  in  the  mid  1980s  amounted  to  140
percent  of the  system's  capital  and  reserves. As a result,  the  government  was
forced  to intervene  in six  banks  that  held 24 percent  of the  banking  system's
total  assets.
1  World  DeveloRment  ReDort,  1989,  pp.  70-724
In th.  Philippines  161  smaller  institutions  holding  3.5  percent  of total
financial  system  assets  were closed  between  1981  and 1987.  In addition,  the
Central  Bank  was forced  to  intervene  in  two  large  public  banks  and  five  private
banks. The  public  banks  were  liquidated  in  1986  and  their  troubled  assets(equal
to 30  percent  of the  banking  system's  asse.s)  were transferred  to a separate
agency. The  five  private  banks  are  still  under  Central  Bank  supervision.  2
It is  important  to  note  that  governments  that  have  closed  insolvent  banks
have  had  to decide  how  the  losses  contained  in  these  banks  should  be allocated,
particularly  whether  depositors  should  absorb  some  of  the  losses.  In  most  cases,
governments  have decided  to shield  depositors,  especially  in the  case of the
failure  of government-owned  banks  and  large  private  banks. The  primary  reason
for  protecting  depositors  appears  to have been the  fear of a loss of public
confidence  and  widespread  bank  runs.  3
In addition  to restructuring  distressed  banks,  some  developing  countries
have taken  two other  actions  to restore  stability  to their  banking  systems.
First, some countries  have attempted  to strengthen  their banking laws and
regulations  and improve  their  bank supervision  and examination  systems.  In
several  cases,  these  actions  were carried  out in connection  with World Bank
2  While  governments  in  some  developing  countries  have  responded  to  distress
in their  banking  systems,  governments  in  other  developing  countries  have  not.
The  principal  reasons  for  this  lack  of  response  by some  countries  appear  to  be:
serious  budgetary  constraints;  an  unwillingness  to  deal  with  the  difficult  equity
decisions  involved  in  allocating  the  losses  of insolvent  banka;  a  reluctance  to
acknowledge  previous  misdirected  lending  to various  public enterprises  and
political  supporters;  and fear that  government  action  might spark  bank runs.
In many  cases,  this lack  of action  allowed  the  situation  to worsen  over time,
in  part  because  managements  of insolvent  banks  pursued  high  risk  ventures  in  a
desperate  attempt  to  return  to solvency.
3  In recent  years,  government  authorities  in  Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,
Thailand  and  Turkey  initially  closed  banks  and  allowed  creditors  to  incur  losses,
but then  felt  compelled  to extend  assistance  to prevent  widespread  bank runs.
See  World  Devel  Reort, 1989,  p. 80.5
sector  adjustment  loans  or IMF  Technical  Assistance  Programs. Second,  several
countries  in recent  years  have established  deposit  insurance  systems. These
countries  include  Chile,  Colombia,  the Dominican  Republic,  Kenya,  Nigeria,
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  and  Yugoslavia.  These  systems  appear  to  have  been  created
to  help  restore  public  confidence  in  the  banking  system,  provide  the  government
with  a formal  mechanism  for  dealing  with  failing  banks,  and  assure  that  small
depositors  would  be protected  in the  event  of bank failures. In addition  to
these  newly  created  systems,  several  developing  countries,  including  Argentina
and Turkey,  that  already  had deposit  insurance  revamped  their  systems  in the
light  of experience.  Moreover,  several  other  developing  countries  that  do  not
have  deposit  insurance  systems  are  now  in  the  process  of  creating  such  a  system
(Brazil)  or  are  considering  the  desirability  of establishing  a system.
Rather  than  relying  on some form  of deposit  protection  to prevent  bank
runs,  governments  could  rely  entirely  on the  lender  of last  resort  mechanism  to
handle  bank runs once they are in progress.  However,  it appears  that many
developing  countries  are reluctant  to abandon  deposit  protection  and place
complete  faith  in the  lender  of last  resort  mechanism  to  handle  a crisis. One
reason  may  be fear  that  bank  runs  will  take  the  form  of  movements  from  deposits
into  cash,  real  assets  or  foreign  exchange,  rather  than  the  transfer  of  deposits
within  the  domestic  banking  system. In the  former  case,  the runs  could  have
serious  adverse  macroeconomic  effects,  including  increased  inflation  from  the
movement  into  real  assets  or downward  pressure  on  the  nation's  foreign  exchange
rate from  the  movement  into  foreign  exchange. Even if the  run takes  the  form
of deposit  transfers  within  the  domestic  banking  system,  developing  countries
may not  be totally  confident  in the  ability  of the lender  of last resort  to
hardle  these  runs  effectively.6
The  recent  burst  of interest  in  deposit  insurance  by developing  countries
is increasingly  causing  the  World  Bank  to  come  to  grips  with these  schemes  and
their  implications  for  the  stability  and  growth  of  banking  systems.  At  present,
the  Bank  appears  to  have  a  favorable  view  of  deposit  insurance  systems.  Indet-  -
the  creation  of such  systems  has formed  a  part  of several  adjustment  programs.
The  International  Monetary  Fund  also  has  advised  a  number  of  developing  countries
on  the  creation  and  operation  of  these  systems.  To  date,  however,  there  has  been
very little  analytical  work done on deposit  insurance  systems  in developing
countries  at the  Bank,  the  Fund,  or elsewhere. Moreover,  policy  makers  could
benefit  from  a  review  of  recent  experience  with  deposit  ins  trarce  systems  in  the
developing  countries.
ScoRe  of Research
This  study  has two  basic  purposes. The  first  is to  analyze  and  evaluate
the implications  and desirability  of creating  deposit insurance  systems in
developing  countries. In order  to do this,  it is first  necessary  to  establish
an  analytical  framework.  In  recent  years,  a  vast  literature  on  deposit  insurance
has been produced. Most of this  work has been done in the United  States  in
response  to widespread  bank and thrift  failures  and the  massive  insolvency  of
the  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  Insurance  Corporation  (the  insurer  of  deposits  in
thrift institutions). Without  explicitly  recognizing  the fact, this vast
literature  has  employed  an  analytical  framework  that  compares  a  deposit  insurance
system  against  a  system  where  the  government  extends  no  protection  to  depositors.*
We believe  that  it  would  be inappropriate  to  use  this  analytical  framework  to
'  The most likely  reason that American  researchers  have adopted this
analytical  framework  is that prior  to the creation  of the deposit  insurance
systems  in  the  United  States  in  the  early  1930s,  the  government  did  not  intervene
to  protect  depositors.analyze  and  evaluate  deposit  insurance  in  developing  countries. The  reason  is
that  developing  countries,  'r  fact,  typically  do intervene  to  protect  depositors
in failing  bank situations. Consequently,  if an analysis  and evaluation  of
deposit  insurance  is  to  be  relevant  and  useful,  it  is  necessary  to  compare  these
explicit  deposit  protection  systems  with  the  implicit  deposit  protection  schemes
that  are  now  widely  employed  in  countries  without  deposit  insurance.  As  might
be expected,  the conclusions  of this  study  regarding  deposit  insurance  differ
significantly  from  those  that  have  emerged  from  the  existing  deposit  insurance
literature.
The second  objective  of this  study  is to identify  the  major  features  of
deposit  insurance  systems,  and  then  review  the  pros  and  cons  of  alternative  ways
of structuring  each  major feature. Some of the major features  that  will be
analyzed  include  the  types  of  financial  institutions  that  should  be  eligible  for
deposit  insurance;  whether  the deposit  insurance  system  should  be public  or
private;  whether  the system  should  be compulsory  or voluntary;  the amount  of
insurance  coverage  that should  be offered  depo--.tors;  and how the deposit
insurance  system  should  be financed.
As part of this study,  we have prepared  a survey  of deposit  insurance
systems  throughout  the  world,  with  particular  emphasis  on  those  in  the  developing
countries.  Appendix  A  contains  a  discussion  of the major fcatures  and
performance  of  a  dozen  deposit  insurance  systems  in  the  developing  world,  as  well
as the  system  in Spain,  which  has recently  served  as a model  for  one or more
developing  countries. Appendix  B contains  a table  of the  major features  of
deposit  insurance  systems  in  both  the  developing  and  developed  world. This  table
is  designed  to  allow  the  reader  to  make  a  quick  comparison  of  the  major  features
of  these  systems. The  survey  updates  and  considerably  expands  an  earlier  survey8
done at the International  Monetary  Fund by Ian McCarthy  in 1979.  More
recently,  Charles  W. Colomiris  has  done  a  survey  of pre-FDIC  regional  deposit
insurance  systems  in the  United  States.  6  Also,  within  the  context  of  broader
surveys  of  financial  regulation  and  supervision,  R.M.  Pecchioli  and  Richard  Dale
reviewed  deposit  insurance  systems  for  O.E.C.D.  countries  and  the  Group  of  Thirry
countries.  7
II.  ANALYSIS  AND  EVALUATION  OF DEPOSIT  INSURANCE
As indicated  earlier,  we believe  that  the  most  useful  way  to analyze  and
evaluate  deposit  insurance  systems  is  to  compare  them  with  the  implicit  deposit
protection  schemes  that  typically  are  employed  in  developing  countries  without
deposit  insurance. In order  to compare  these  two  systems,  it is necessary  to
specify  the  major features  of implicit  and  explicit  systems. It is important
to emphasize  that  in  actual  practice  implicit  and  explicit  systems  do  not take
the same form in every  country. Consequently,  it is  necessary  to generalize
their basic features.  We believe that these generalizations  constitute  a
satisfactory  basis  for  reaching  conclusions  regarding  the  pros  and  cons  of the
two systems.  Of course,  in evaluating  the two systems  in a given  country,
policymakers  should  identify  the  specific  features  of the  two  systems  in that
country,  and  then  use  these  features  to  compare  the  systems.
3 Ian  S.  McCarthy,  'Deposit  Insurance:  Theory  anid  Practice",  International
Monetary  Fund,  Staff  Papers,  September  1980,  pp.  578-600.
6  Charles  W. Colomiris,  'Deposit  Insurance:  Lessons from the Record",
Economic  Perspective,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Chicago,  May/June  1989,  pp 10-30.
7  R.M.  Pecchioli,  Prudential  SuRervision  in  Banking,  1987,  pp.  133-48;  and
Richard  Dale,  The  Regulation  of International  Banking,  1987,  pp.  141-55.9
Nature  of Implicit  Deposit  Protection  SysteMs
In  an implicit  deposit  protection  system  (IDPS),  government  protection  of
depositors  is totally  discretionary. The government  offers  such  protection,
not  because  it is obliged  to do so by law.  but  because  it believes  that  such
action  will achieve  certain  public  policy  goals,  because  it  may feel  at least
partly  responsible  for the losses  that  must be absorbed,  or because it may
consider  it  to  be cheaper  in  the  long  run  to  do  so. Moreover,  the  determination
of the  amount  and form of the protection  is based  on ad hoc decision  making
within  the  government.  No preexisting  rules  and  procedures  guide  the  decision
making  process,  although  prior  actions  in similar  circumstances  may influence
the  outcome. Any  protection  offered  depositors  normally  would  be financed  out
of the  government's  current  budget  or through  the  Central  Bank.
In an IDPS, the government  can extend  protection  in three  basic  w-7ays.
First,  when  an  insolvent  bank  is  closed,  the  government  can  make  direct  payments
to  depositors  or  arrange  for  the  failed  bank's  deposits  to  be  assumed  by another
bank.  Second,  the  governmo.it  could  arrange  and  financially  support  the  merger
of a  problem  bank  into  another  bank. This  initiative  would  prevent  the  failure
of the  bank, thereby  protecting  all depositors. Finally,  the government  can
prevent  the  failure  by rehabilitating  the  bank. This  rehabilitation  could  take
the form of a direct  equity  capital  injection  into the  bank.  Alternatively,
the  government  could  acquire  some  or all  of the  failing  bank's  non-performing
assets  at book value.  This transaction  would be tantamount  to an equity
injection,  and  also  would  have the  advantage  of giving  the  bank a fresh  start
with a clean  portfolio. With  both types  of rehabilitation,  the  government  is
likely  to  emerge  as  the  dominant  shareholder,  thereby  effectively  nationalizing
the  bank.10
Nature  of Degosit  Insurance  Svstems
A deposit  insurance  system  (DIS)  is  created  by the  passage  of a depoit
insurance  statute,  which  sets  forth  the  rules  and  procedures  for  the  operation
of the system.  In particular,  the act  would specify  the types  of financial
institutions  and  deposits that would be  eligible for  insurance,  whether
membership  in the  system  would  be voluntary  or compulsory,  the  maximum  amount
of deposits  that  would  be insured,  how  the  system  would  be funded,  the  devices
the  insurer  could  employ  to  resolve  failing  bank  situations,  and  so forth.
The amount  of protection  th't a DIS extends  depositors  depends  on the
maximum  insurance  coverage  specified  in  the  statute  and  whether  the  insurer  has
authority  to resolve failing  bank situatiocas  ir.  ways that extend  de facto
protection  to  uninsured  depositors.  For  purposes  of this  study,  we will  focus
on  three  basic  insurance  coverage  schemes.  These  three  schemes  cover  quite  well
the  range  of deposit  protection  incorporated  in  DISs that  already  exist. The
major features  of these  three schemes  are presented  in Table 1, and can be
compared  with the  major  features  of an IDPS  and a system  where the  government
does  not  intervene  in  failing  bank situations.11
Table  1
Alternative  DeDosit  Protection  Sche..s
Nature  of  Protection  O)ffered  Nodaliti  of  Ooeration
Small  Large  mnrger  or
SYPS  of  System  Prototwee  Denositors  Devositors  Liauidatfon  Rehabilitation
No Intervention  U.S.  before  None  None  No  No
1934
Implioit  System  Thailand,  DiscretLonary  DLscretlonary  Possible  Likely
Malaysia
Deposit  Ynsurnce  System
LLlted Caverage  Austri-a,  Cuar_ed  None  Yes  No
France,
Germany
lOOZ Coverage  Argentina,  Guaranteed  Guaranteed  Possible  likely
1946-71
Dlscretionary  U.S.,  Guaranteed  Discretienary  Possible  Likely
Coverage  Spain12
The  lmlte;  poverage  scheme is designed  primarily to protect small
depositors  when  banks  fail. Under  this  scheme,  deposit  accounts  are  insured  up
to a  certain  maximum  amount. When  a bank fails,  the  insur-3r  is authorized  to
pay  off insured  depositors  up to the  maximum  amount,  or  arrange  for  all  of the
failed  bank's  insured  deposits  to  be transferred  to  another  bank. With  a  limited
coverage  scheme,  the  insurer  is  not  authorized  to  rehabilitate  banks  or  arrange
financially  assisted  mergers,  because  to  do  so  would  extend  de facto  protection
to  uninsuied  depositors  by preventing  failures.
The 100  Dercent  coverage  scheme  is at the other  end of the protection
continuum. Under this scheme,  all deposit  accounts  are fully  insured. The
insurer  can  employ  a  broad  range  of  devices  to  resolve  failing  bank  situations,
including  insured  deposit  payoffs  or transfers,  financially  assisted  mergers,
and rehabilitations. It should  be noted that 100  percent  deposit  insurance
systems  have  been  widely  discussed  in  public  policy  circles  and in  the  deposit
insurance  literature,  but in  practice  have  rarely  been  implemented.
The discretionary  coverage  scheme  lies  between  limited  coverage  and  100
percent  insurance.  In  a  discretionary  coverage  system,  all  deposit  accounts  are
insured  up to a certain  amount  (as  with a limited  coverage  scheme). However,
unlike  a  limited  coverage  system, the insurer  is authorized  under certain
circumstances  to  extend  de facto  coverage  .o  uninsured  depositors  by using  a
purchase  and assumption  transaction  to resolve  a failure 8, or by arranging  a
financially  assisted  merger  or  rehabilitation  to  prevent  a  failure.  The  special
circumstances  that  would  have  to  prevail  before  the  insurer  could  extend  de  facto
8  In  a  purchase  and  assumption  transaction,  the  insurer  arranges  for  another
bank to  assume  alU of a failing  bank's  deposits  and  acquire  some  or all  of the
failing  bank's  assets  in return  for a cash payment  by the insurer.  Such a
transaction  also could be used with 100 percent  coverage  or in an implicit
system.13
protection  to  uninsured  depositors  would  be:  (1)  the  banking  system  is  threatened
by a loss  of public  confidence  that  might  result  in  widespread  bank  runs;  and
(2) the need to protect  against  bank runs outweighs  the erosion  of market
discipline  that extending  de facto  protection  to uninsured  depositors  would
entail. In sum,  a discretionary  coverage  scheme  would  function  like  a limited
coverage  arrangement  when the  banking  system  is not threatened,  but could  be
converted into a  de facto 100 percent insurance system if a  threat is
sufficiently  serious  to  justify  an  erosion  of  market  discipline.  It should  be
noted that, given the instability  and banking  concentration  often found  in
banking  systems  in developing  countries,  a  discretionary  coverage  system  might
be  used frequently  to  protect  uninsured  depositors.
While  deposit  insurance  systems  can  be financed  in  a  variety  of  ways,  by
far  the  most  common  way  is  to  create  a  deposit  insurance  fund  and  require  insured
banks  to  make  periodic  premium  payments  to  the  fund. The  government  often  makes
an initial  equity  capital  contribution  to  the  fund  to give  the  DIS  some  degree
of credibility  at the  beginning. In some  DISs,  the insurer  has authority  to
borrow  from  the  Central  Bank  or the  Treasury  in  order  to meet  its  obligations.
Also,  the  government  may  be authorized  to contribute  additional  equity  if the
fund's  capital  should  be depleted  by losses.
Comparison  of the  Two  Systems
The  goals  of  IDPSs  and  DISs are  essentially  the  same--to  promote  banking
stability  and  the  development  of the  banking  system  and  to  contribute  to social
justice  by protecting  small  depositors  from  losses  when  banks  fail. At  the  same
time,  there  are  some important  differences  in the  features  of IDPSs  and  DISs.
These differences  are presented  in Table 2.  The identification  of these14
differences  is crucial  because they serve  as the basis for evaluating  the
relative  effects  and  desirability  of these  two  alternative  deposit  protection
systems. In the  evaluation  process,  we will  focus  on the  following  six  areas:
(1)  the  failure  resolution  process; (2)  the  problem  of moral  hazard;  (3)  the
prevention  of bank runs;  (4) the  protection  of small depositors;  (5)  the
treatment  of banks;  and  (6)  the  capacity  to absorb  large  losses.
Table  2
Maior  Differences  Between  Implicit  Deposit  Protection  Systems
and  DeRosit  Insurance  Systems
Feature  Implicit  Systems  Devosit  Insurance  Systems




Obligation  to  protect  No legal  obligation;  Legal  obligation  to
depositors  protection  is  at the  protect  depositors  up
discretion  of the  to the  insurance  limit;
government.  insurer  may  have
discretion  to  protect
uninsured  depositors.
Amount  of protection  Can  vary  from  no  Can  vary from  limited
extended  to  depositors protection  to total  protection  to total
protection.  protection.
Ex  ante  funding  None  Typically  banks  through
premium  payments;
government  may  provide
initial  capitalization
and  possibly  regular
payments.
Funding  in  event  of  Government  From  fund;  shortfalls
bank failure  may  be covered  by
special  assessments
levied  on  banks  or  by
loans  or  additional
capital  from  government.15
The  Failure  Resolution  Process
In handling failing bank situations,  IDPSs and  DISs have certain
similarities  and dissimilarities.  The two  systems  are  alike  in that  both  can
employ  the same  failure  resolution  devices  --  closing  and liquidating  failing
banks,  merging  the  banks  ot rehabilitating  the  banks  to prevent  their  failure.
However,  as  will  be discussed  below,  the  two  systems  are  different  regarding  the
administrative  process  involved  in  resolving  failures.
The administrative  process for handling  failing  banks and protecting
depositors  should  be fast  and  smooth  and  produce  outcomes  that  are  relatively
consistent  over time.  Based  on these  criteria,  a DIS should  produce  better
results  than  an IDPS. A DIS should  result  in faster  and smoother  resolutions
because  it  operates  on  the  basis  of  established  rules  and  procedures  spelled  out
in the deposit insurance  statute.  Moreover,  a DIS is prefunded,  thereby
eliminating  the  need  to  determine  the  funding  source  for  protecting  depositors.
In  marked  contrast,  the  process  of  handling  failing  banks  and  protecting
depositors  with an IDPS  will  not  necessarily  be fast  and smooth,  and  outcomes
are  likely  to  be unpredictable  and inconsistent  over time.  An IDPS  does  not
operate  on the  basis  of predetermined  rules  and  procedures.  Rather,  the  entire
process  is discretionary  and ad hoc, with only previous  actions  in somewhat
similar  circumstances  serving  as a  possible  guide. Moreover,  because  an IDPS
is  not prefunded,  the  government  will have to determine  a source  of funding.
If the  source  is the government  budget,  action  by both the executive  and
legislative  branches  would  likely  be  required.  This  required  action  may  be slow
and  constitute  a serious  problem  in  a  banking  crisis  when  public  confidence  is
eroding  at  a fast  pace.  Finally,  an IDPS  is  apt  to  be subject  to  considerable16
political  pressures,  thereby  making  outcomes  less  predictable  and  consistent  over
time.
With  an IDPS,  however,  the  government  has  considerable  degrees  of freedom
regarding  the  protection  of  depositors  in  failing  bank situations.  First,  the
government  can  control  the  amount  of  protection  offered. At one extreme,  the
government  could extend  no protection  at all.  At the other extreme,  the
government  could  fully  protect  all  depositors  --  an action  that  is  most likely
to be taken in the case of a large,  highly  visible  bank where widespread
depositor  losses  might  undermine  public  confidence  in  the  entire  banking  system.
The government  also  would  have the  discretion  to protect  all  depositors  up to
a certain  amount  of deposits,  thereby  assuring  that  all small  depositors  are
fully  protected.
In  an IDPS,  the  government  also  has  discretion  to determine  the  form  and
timinz  of  the  protection  offered  depositors.  For  example,  the  government  could
pay off depositors  of a failed  bank in the form  of either  cash  or government
securities.  Moreover,  the  total  payment  to  depositors  could  be  made  very  shortly
after  a  bank  failure,  or  could  be in  the  form  of installments  stretched  out  over
a considerable  period,  thereby  lowering  the  present  value  of  the  total  payment.
In  contrast  to  an IDPS,  the  rules  that  govern  a DIS  tend  to  constrain  in
some degree the deposit  protection  options  available  to the insurer.  For
example,  since  the  insurer  is  legally  obligated  to  protect  insured  depositors,
the insurer  does not have the  option  of walking  away from protecting  these
depositors  in individual  cases,  as can  be done  by the  government  with an IDPS.
Likewise,  with  a  DIS  the  insurer  typically  is  required  to  pay  off  depositors  in
cash (rather  than using  some other  types  of assets),  and the insurer  cannot17
stretch  out payments  over time in order  to reduce  the  present  value  of these
payments.
In sum,  the  various  constraints  contained  in the  law  governing  a DIS  can
rule oat cheaper options,  thereby making a  DIS a more expensive  deposit
protection  device  than  an  IDPS. On  the  other  hand,  in  some  cases  the  rules  under
which a DIS operates  may give the insurer  greater  protection  from  political
pressure  to  bail  out  all  depositors  than  the  government  would  have  under  an  IDPS.
If so,  a DIS  could  turn  out  to  be a cheaper  device.
Moral  Hazard
The problem  of moral hazard  arises  from the distortion  in incentives
induced  by deposit  protection,  whether  implicit  or explicit. The  presence  of
protection  affects  the  behavior  of the  economic  agents  involved,  particularly
their  willingness  to assume  greater  risk.  Both  bankers  and depositors  may  be
subject  to  moral  hazard.
If deposit protection is achieved  by  bailing out banks and  their
shareholders,  shareholders  may  be subject  to  moral  hazard  by their  ability  to
bet oa the  government's  or the  insurer's  money.  In this  case,  banks  can  earn
higher  returns  without  facing  the  potential  losses  associated  with  higher  risk
strategies.  However,  it  must  be  recognized  that  this  danger  can  be  present  even
without  deposit  protection  because  the  existence  of  limited  liability  introduces
an asymmetry  in the risk/return  trade off.  Furthermore,  if the deposit
protection  is  structured  so  that  shareholders  and  managers  do  not  benefit  from
deposit  protection,  the  introduction  of this  protection  need  not increase  the
moral  hazard  of  bankers.
Depositors  also  experience  moral  hazard  in  that  they  no longer  assume  the
risk  associated  with  their  choice  of  depository  institution.  If the  investment18
decision  is  made  without  regard  to the  financial  condition  of the  institution,
the  market  fails  to  exert  a  disciplining  effect  on  banks.
The issue  of moral  hazard  has received  a great  deal  of attention  in the
deposit  insurance  literature.  While  deposit  insurance  clearly  involves  moral
hazard, the central role given to moral hazard is often overstated.  In
evaluating  the moral  hazard  asseciated  with deposit  insurance,  the  basis of
comparison  should  be  a  world  with  implicit  protection  and  limited  liability,  both
of which already  introduce  a significant  degree  of moral  hazard.  Thus, the
relevant  measure  should  be the  incremental  amount  of  moral  hazard  introduced  by
switching  to an explicit  deposit  protection  system,  rather  than  focusing  only
on the  absolute  amount  of moral  hazard  associated  with a DIS.
Returning  to  the  comparison  of  DISs  and  IDPSs,  the  degree  of  moral  hazard
induced  by each type  of scheme  will depend  directly  on (i)  whether  protection
is  extended  to  bank  management  and  shareholders,  and  (ii)  the  feeling  of  safety
imparted  to depositors.  Because  explicit  systems  operate  through  a set of
established  rules,  they  can (and  should)  completely  eliminate  the  expectation
of  managers  and  shareholders  that  they  will  benefit  from  DIS  actions. Because
such  options  are  not  ruled  out  in IDPSs,  these  systems  are  likely  to result  in
greater  moral  hazard  on the  part  of bankers.
As to  the  feeling  of  safety  enjoyed  by  depositors,  this  will  depend  on (i)
the  level  of  coverage  offered,  and  (ii)  the  public's  confidence  in  the  protection
system. In our  view,  a DIS  is likely  to involve  somew'hat  more  moral  hazard  on
the  part  of  depositors  than  an  equally  credible  IDPS. The  reason  is  that  a DIS
tends  to  extend  more  assured  deposit  protection.  9  With  a DIS,  some  depositors
9  A priori,  it is not clear  whether  a DIS or an IDPS would  have more
credibility.19
are  given  full  protection  and  all  depositors  have  at least  some  protection.  By
contrast,  with an IDPS,  no depositors  are  guaranteed  protection. In the  case
of  a  DIS  with  a  high  coverage  level,  the  system  could  involve  considerably  more
moral  hazard  than  an  equally  credible  IDPS.
In conclusion,  it is not possible  to establish  categorically  how the
conversion  from  an  implicit  protection  scheme  to  an  explicit  scheme  would  affect
the  overall  amount  of  moral  hazard  in  the  banking  system. In  general,  however,
it  seems  likely  that  the  conversion  would  result  in  less  moral  hazard  on  the  part
of the  bankers,  but  more  moral  hazard  on the  part  of the  depositors.
Bank  Runs
The  ability  of  deposit  protection  systems  to  stem  bank  runs  depends  on  the
extent  that  depositors  feel  protected  from  loss  in  the  event  of a  bank failure.
As indicated  above,  a DIS is likely  to extend  somewhat  more assured  deposit
protection  than  an IDPS.  Consequently,  it follows  that  a DIS is likely  to  be
somewhat  more effective  than  an IDPS in preventing  bank runs.  Moreover,  the
difference  in  the  effectiveness  of the  two  systems  would  tend  to  be greater  the
higher  the  coverage  of the  explicit  system.
Small  Depositor  Protection
One of the traditional  objectives  of deposit  protection  systems  is to
protect small depositors.  Both IDPSs and DISs are potentially  capable  of
protecting  small  depositors. However,  DISs appear  to be better  designed  to
accomplish  this  objective  because  the  protection  of small  depositors  is in the
form  of a  legal  obligation,  and  this  legal  obligation  is  backed  up  by a  deposit
insurance  fund. By  contrast,  IDPSs  involve  no  legal  obligations  to  protect  even
small  depositors.20
Treatment  of  Banks
One of the  more important  differences  between  an IDPS  and a DIS is the
treatment  of banks.  An IDPS  confers  a subsidy  on banks  that increases  their
profits. By contrast,  a DIS  either  could  confer  a subsidy  on  banks  or impose
a tax.
By  extending  some  form  of  protection  to  depositors,  an  IDPS  lowers  the  risk
of deposits. This  reduction  in  risk  should  result  in  portfolio  adjustments  by
wealth  holders  that  would  lower  the  interest  rate  on deposits. This  reduction
in  banks'  cost  of  funds  should  increase  bank  profits. 10 With  an  IDPS,  the  losses
incurred  from protecting  depositors  are absorbed  entirely  by the government
(taxpayers)  or  the  Central  Bank. Consequently,  since  banks  derive  benefits  from
an IDPS,  but shoulder  none  of the  costs,  an IDPS  confers  a subsidy  on  banks. 11
By contrast,  the effect  of a DIS on banks is unclear.  On the one  hand,  by
protecting  depositors,  a DIS lowers  banks'  cost  of funds. On the  other  hand,
the  costs  of  protecting  depositors,  while  initially  absorbed  by  the  insurer,  are
uitimately  passed  on to  banks  in the  form  of premium  payments.
10  Depending  on competitive  conditions  in the  banking  industry,  banks  may
pass on at least  some  of these  profits  to their  customers  in the form  of more
favorable  prices  on  banking  services.
11  This  conclusion  assumes  that  the  government  does  not make  an effort  to
offset  this  subsidy  in some  way--for  example,  by imposing  some form  of tax  or
regulatory  requirement  on banks  that would  have the effect  of lowering  bank
profits.21
Capacity  to  Absorb  Losses
One  of the  key  features  of  a deposit  protection  system  is  the  ability  to
absorb  losses  when  banks  fail. If  a  system  lacks  the  resources  to  absorb  losses,
bank  supervisors  may  be forced  to  allow  insolvent  banks  to  continue  to  operate.
Experience  has  shown  that  the  failure  to  close  insolvent  banks  is  apt  to  compound
the  problem  of  banking  instability  because  insolvent  banks  have  an incentive  to
take  high risks  in  an attempt  to return  to solvency.
With  an  IDPS,  losses  are  absorbed  either  by  the  national  government  budget
or  the  Central  Bank. Both  of  these  constitute  potentially  large  funding  sources,
far  exceeding  the  resources  of even a well financed  DIS.  However,  national
government  budgets  typically  have  strong  contending  demands,  and  governments  may
be  reluctant to use  Central Bank resources because of  the  inflationary
implications.  Therefore,  the  actual  capacity  of an IDPS  to  absorb  losses  may
be significantly  less  than  its  considerable  potential.
With  most  TISs,  losses  are  absorbed  by an insurance  fund  set  up for  that
purpose. The  ab.  ity  of  a DIS  to  meet  its  obligations  depends  primarily  on the
fund's  initial  capitalization,  the amount  of premiums  paid into the fund  by
insured  banks  over  time,  the  size  of the  payments  made to  resolve  failing  bank
situations,  and  the  ability  of the  fund  to  borrow  or receive  additional  capital
injections  when its  resources  are  exhausted.
It is  certairly  possible  for  nations  to establish  financially  sound  DISs
that are capable  of dealing  effectively  with sizable  losses.  However,  the
historical  record  indicates  that  developing  countries  typically  do not  create
such systems. Rather,  they tend  to set up DISs that  have relatively  little
capital  and  do  not  have  strong  government  back  up support  that  DISs  may  need to
get  through  a difficult  period. As a result,  the  systems  lack  credibility  and22
are frequently  frozen  into inaction. The following  case illustrates  these
problems.
Between  1984  and 1988,  the  DIS in the Philippines  had to deal  with ckh
failure  of approximately  140  banks  representing  6  percent  of total  deposits  of
the  banking  system. Because  the  fund  did not  have sufficient  resources,  the
insurer  had  to  borrow  extensively  in  order  to  meet  its  obligations.  In  addition,
the  insurer  raised  bank  assessments,  which  had  the  effect  of  reducing  the  profits
of  an  already  troubled  banking  system. There  is  also  reason  to  believe  that  the
insurer,  in order  to be able to report  a positive  net worth,  did not make
adequate  provisions  for  losses  incurred  in the  liquidations.
There  is  evidence  that  several  of the  DISs  recently  created  in  developing
countries  have  not  been  given  sound  financial  structures.  For  example,  when  the
government  of  Kenya  set  up  a DIS  in  1985,  it  provided  the  system  with  no initial
capital.  Likewise,  when the Nigerian  government  set up a DIS in 1988, it
provided  the  system  with  initial  capital  equal  to only  about  one  thousandth  of
the  total  assets  of  the  banking  system,  even  though  it  was  known  that  the  banking
system  contained  several  insolvent  banks.  In both  Kenya  and  Nigeria,  it  will
take  substantial  time  for  the  DIS  to build  up sufficient  resources  to  be able
to  handle  any  significant  number  of insolvent  banks.
There  is  also  much  to learn  about  DISs  from  the  recent  deposit  insurance
crisis  involving  the  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  Insurance  Corporation  in  the  United
States. In  the  mid  1980s,  this  insurer  of  savings  and  loan  associations  suffered
large  losses  that  depleted  the  fund.  While  the  insurer  had limited  authority
to  borrow  from  the  United  States  Treasury,  this  authority  was  minuscule  relative
to the  resources  needed  to  handle  remaining  insolvent  institutions.  Since  it
was obvious  that  the  insurer  could  not  perform  if  additional  insolvent  thrifts23
were  closed,  the  supervisor  of these  institutions  allowed  these  institutions  to
continue  in  operation.  The  management  of  some  of  these  institutions,  recognizing
that  they  would  not  be closed,  proceedud  to acquire  very  high yield/high  risk
assets  in a  desperate  attempt  to  return  to solvency.  As it  turned  out,  many  of
the  bets  that  these  managements  placed  did  not  pay  off. As a  result,  by the  time
that the United  States  government  finally  worked  out a plan to resolve  the
deposit  insurance  crisis,  the  aggregate  losses  of  insolvent  thrifts  had  ballooned
to  well  over  $100  billion.
Summary  and  Conclusion
In this  section,  we have  analyzed  and  evaluated  DISs  relative  to IDPSs,
which  are  used  in  most  developing  countries  that  do  not  have  deposit  insurance.
We argued  that  a  DIS  has  both  advantages  and  disadvantages  compared  to  an IDPS.
First,  a  DIS  constitutes  a  better  administrative  process  for  resolving  failing
bank  situations  and  protecting  depositors.  It  tends  to  be faster,  smoother  and
more  predictable  that  an IDPS,  and  it tends  to  produce  more  consistent  results
over time.  The reason  is that a DIS operates  on the  basis of predetermined
"rules  of the  game",  whereas  decision-making  with  an IDPS  is  discretionary  and
ad  hoc. On the  other  hand,  the  inherent  flexibility  contained  in  an IDPS  gives
policymakers  more  degrees  of freedom  in  fashioning  deposit  protection  remedies.
Consequently,  policymakers  should  have  more  control  over the  amount,  form  and
timing  of the  protection  offered. Second,  a  DIS  is  more  effective  in  protecting
small  depositors  because  it is, in part,  designed  to accomplish  this result.
By contrast,  small  depositors  may  not  be protected  in  some  cases  with an IDPS,
particularly  in the  case  of  the  failure  of  a small  bank. Third,  a  DIS  provides
a vehicle  for shifting  some  of the  costs  of deposit  protection  to the  banking
system.  This seems appropriate  because  banks derive  benefits  from deposit24
protection  in  the  form  of  a  lower  cost  of  funds. By  ccntrast,  with  an  IDPS  banks
derive  the  benefits  of deposit  protection,  but incur  none of the  costs. As a
result,  an IDPS  subsidizes  banks  at the  expense  of taxpayers.
It is  widely  argued  in  the  deposit  insurance  literature  that  the  primary
problem  with deposit  insurance  is moral  hazard.  We do not share  this  view.
While  there  is  no question  that  deposit  insurance  involves  moral  hazard,  it is
not clear that it involves  any more moral  hazard than an IDPS,  which most
countries  use in  the  absenice  of  a formal  DIS. It is  not  the  absolute  amount  of
moral  hazard  that  is  important,  but  rather  the  relative  amount.
Instead,  we believe  that the major problem  with DISs, particularly  in
developing  countries,  is that  they  tend  to  be given  weak financial  structures.
This  is  an  especially  serious  problem  in  developing  countries  because  tney  tend
to  have  unstable  banking  systems  that  are  likely  to  produce  large  losses. Given
this  situation,  we  believe  that  the  World  Bank  should  adopt  a wgo  sloww  policy
regarding  the creation  of DISs in developing  countries.  DISs should be
considered  only in those  countries  that: (i)  have at least a fairly  stable
banking  system;  (ii)  have  an  effective  prudential  regulation  and  bank  supervision
system;  and  (iii)  exhibit  a  willingness  to  adequately  fund  a  DIS  and  give  it  the
necessary  government  back up support  that may be required  to get the system
through  a  period  of  stress. In  our  judgment,  there  probably  are  relatively  few
developing  countries  that  now  meet  these  conditions.
For  those  countries  that  do  not  meet  these  conditions,  the  emphasis  should
be  placed  on  trying  to  get  the  banking  system  under  control. In  many  countries,
this  would  require  stabilizing  the  macroeconomic  environment  in  which  banks  and
business  firms  have  to  operate,  strengthening  the  nation's  banking  laws  and  bank25
supervisory  and  examination  systems,  and  continuing  to  rely  on  an  IDPS  to  protect
depositors  and  restructure  banks.
III. MAJOR  FEATURES  OF DEPOSIT  INSURANCE  SYSTEM
While  deposit  L$surance  is  a  relatively  simple  concept,  deposit  insurance
systems  are relatively  complex  mechanisms. In setting  up a deposit  insurance
system,  nations  have  to  make  a  sizable  number  of  decisions  regarding  the  system's
major  features.  The  objective  of  this  section  is  to  identify  the  major  features,
review  the pros and cons of the alternative  ways that  each feature  could  be
structured,  and  offer  recommendations  regarding  the  preferred  options.
TyRes  of Institutions  Covered
In some developing  countries,  only commercial  banks are eligible  for
deposit  insurance. In  most  developing  countries,  however,  the  DIS  includes  at
least  some  non-commercial  bank  depository  institutions,  such  as  savings  and  loan
associations,  savings  banks,  merchant  banks,  credit  unions,  and development
banks.
The  type  of institutions  that  ought  to  be included  in  a  DIS  depends  on the
purpose  of the  system  in individual  countries. If the primary  purpose  is to
protect  the payments  mechanism,  the system  logically  could be confined  to
commercial  banks  and  any other  depository  institutions  that  issue  transaction
accounts.  However,  most  nations  view  a  DIS  as  having  broader  purposes  than  just
protecting  the  payments  system,  including  protecting  small  depositors,  promoting
savings in  the  economy and  fostering the  development  of  the  financial
intermediation  process. For  nations  having  these  broader  objectives,  it  would26
seem appropriate  to include  in the DIS all types of institutions  that are
authorized  to issue  deposits  to the  public. 12
There are two other reasons for including  all  types of depository
institutions  in the system.  First,  if some depository  institutions  are not
insured  and they  begin to experience  runs,  these  runs may spill  over on to
insured  institutions. The reason  is that during  a panic depositors  may not
carefully  distinguish  between insured  and uninsured  institutions.  Second,
differential  access  to  deposit  insurance  could  confer  advantages  on  various  types
of  competing  depository  institutions,  thereby  introducing  distortions  within  the
financial  sector.
12  I  is also  possible  for  a country  to restrict  deposit  insurance  to one
or  several  types  of  depository  institutions  in  order  to  promote  their  development
relative  to  other  institutions.  For  example,  in  Paraguay  deposit  protection  was
restricted  to  a  narrow  set  of  newly  established,  deposit-issuing  mortgage  banks
in  order  to  promote  mortgage  lending.27
Public  Versus  Private  Systems
Existing  DISs  take  a  variety  of forms  with  regards  to their  sponsorship,
administration  and  financing,  and  cover  a  broad  range  from  pure  public  systems
to  pure  private  systems. At one  end  of  the  continuum  (we  will  arbitrarily  call
it  the  "left")  are  unconditional  government  guarantee  systems  that  are  entirely
managed  and  funded  by  the  national  government.  The  present  system  in  Yugoslavia
and the  earlier  systems  in Chile  (up  to 1986)  and  Argentina  (up  to 1979)  fall
into  this  category. At the  left  of center  are  government-run  schemes  that  are
administered  by  a  separate  deposit  insurance  corporation  that  is  funded  at least
partially  by  the insured banks.  The amount of  independence  that these
corporations  have,  particularly  with regards  to the  Central  Bank,  varies  from
country  to country. In the  present  deposit  insurance  system  in  Argentina  and
the  earlier  systems  in Spain  (up  to 1980)  and  Turkey  (up  to 1983)  the insurer
is,  or was, intricately  connected  with  the  Central  Bank.  By contrast,  in the
present  schemes  in India,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  the Philippines,  and  Turkey  (after
1983),  the  insurer  enjoys  a greater  degree  of independence.  At the  center  of
the  continuum  are  government-sponsored  deposit  insurance  corporations  that  are
managed  by representatives  drawn  from  both  the  government  and  the  banks. Bank
representatives  are  in the  minority  in Cuba  and  Colombia,  but in Spain  (after
1980),  banks have equal representation  with the government.  These  jointly
administered  insurers  are  at  least  partially  funded  by  the  banks. Leaning  toward
the  right  are  schemes  that  are  mandated  or  encouraged  by the  government,  but  are
owned,  managed  and  financed  by the  banks.  The system  now being  developed  in
Brazil  fits  into  this  category,  as  do  the  existing  systems  in  France  and  Germany.
At the extreme right are systems (as in Switzerland)  that merely involve
voluntary  private  agreewonts  among  banks  to insure  each  others'  deposits. The28
government  plays no role in sponsoring  and administering  such systems  and
provides  no financing.
There  seems  to  be a tendency  for  more  recently  established  DISs to rely
less  on  government  financing  and  management  than  earlier  schemes. In fact,  all
countries  that  have  recently  reformed  their  DISs  have  moved  further  to  the  right
on the continuum.  For example,  Spain's DIS was made independent  of the
government  in  1980,  Argentina  and  Chile  moved  from  sole  reliance  on government
funding  to  a  system  that  is  at  least  partially  funded  by  banks,  and  bank  funding
for  Turkey's  DIS  was  increased  after  1983. The  reason  for  this  movement  to  the
right, especially  regarding  funding,  may be  that governments  have become
increasingly  unwilling  to.  accept  the  full  burden  of  potentially  unlimited  losses.
In general,  developing  countries  rely  to a greater  extent  on government
participation  in deposit insurance  systems than is the case in developed
countries. There  are  several  factors  that  may  account  for  this  tendency:
(1)  banks  in developed  countries  have the  financial  strength  to absorb
the  additional  cost  of  deposit  insurance  assessments  and  to  face  potentially  high
contingent  liabilities,  whereas  thase factors  could  constitute  an excessive
burden  for  banks  in  developing  countries;
(2)  because  banking  systems  in developing  countries  are small,  banking
activity  is  very interconnected  and  hence  mutual  insurance  would  be unworkable;
(3)  bank ownership  in developing  countries  is tilted  more toward  the
government,  and  it  is  only  reasonable  for  the  government  to  be directly  involved
in  the  insurance  of  its  own banks;  and
(4)  private  management  of  a  DIS  would  tend  to  drain  the  already  very
limited  managerial  resources  of  private  banks  in  many  developing  countries.29
The appropriate  public  sector-private  sector  mix for a DIS could  vary
significantly  from  country  to country,  depending  on the  unique  characteristics
and  capabilities  of these  countries. In general,  however,  DISs in developing
countries  are far  more likely  to achieve  their  objective  of preserving  public
confidence,  promoting  the  development  of the  financial  sector,  and  protecting
small  deposits  if they  employ  either  a public  system  or a quasi-public  system
(a  system  that  is  jointly  managed  by government  and  banking  officials,  but  has
some form  of government  financial  backing). Private  systems  that  rely  solely
on  the  banking  industry  for  financial  support  typically  should  be  avoided  because
they  are  apt  to  break  down  during  a  banking  crisis.
Losses  incurred  by  a  deposit  insurance  system  are  highly  unpredictable  and
are  likely  to  be large  during  a  period  of  adversity.  These  large  losses  may  well
exceed  the  resources  of the insurance  fund,  in  which  case  a capital  injection
by the  sponsors  would  be needed. A national  government,  which  stands  behind  a
public  or quasi-public  system,  generally  would  have  much greater  capacity  to
provide  capital  than  would  the  banking  industry,  which  stands  behind  a private
system. During  a  banking  crisis,  some  banks  are  likely  to suffer  an  erosion  of
capital. The  need to transfer  some  of their  remaining  capital  to the  deposit
insurance  fund  would  further  weaken  their  position.  On  the  other  hand,  a  refusal
by some  banks  to  provide  capital  might  result  in  the  insurer  being  unable  to  meet
its obligations. This inability  could  produce  a loss of confidence  in the
deposit  insurance  system  and  precipitate  widespread  runs  on  the  banks. In  sum,
a  private  system  where  the  banking  industry,  in effect,  insures  its  own  losses
is inherently  vulnerable  and  is  unlikely  to  be successful  over  the  long  run.
A possible  alternative  way to  design  a private  deposit  insurance  system
is to have nonbanking  organizations  provide  the insurance. The most likely30
provider  would  be  the  insurance  industry.  However,  there  are  a  number  of  reasons
for doubting  that such an arrangement  would be feasible.  First, in most
developing  countries  the banking industry  is far larger  than the insurance
industry. As a result,  the  insurance  industry  would  not  have the  capacity  to
underwrite  deposit  insurance. Second,  even if the  insurance  industry  had the
capacity,  it is  not  clear  that  they  would  want to  underwrite  deposit  insurance
because  of  the  risk--bank  failures  do  not  tend  to  be independent  events. Third,
insurance  companies  probably  would  be unwilling  to insure  deposits  unless  they
could  close  insolvent  banks--authority  that  the  government  almost  surely  would
be  unwilling  to  grant." 3 Finally,  insurance  companies  almost  surely  would  want
the  power  to cancel  the insurance  of individual  banks.  The  act  of cancelling
insurance,  however,  is likely  to precipitate  a large scale  run on the bank
involved  and  lead  to its  failure. It is  doubtful  that  the  government  would  be
willing  to give a private insurer  that degree  of control  over the fate of
individual  banks.
Compulsory  versus  Voluntarv  Systems
DISs  can  be  either  compulsory  or  voluntary. In  most  developing  countries
(and  a  majority  of developed  countries),  banks  are  required  to  join  the  system.
The  only truly  voluntary  system  in the  developing  world  at present  is the  one
in Argentina.  The system  now being developed  in Brazil  will be a mixed
compulsory/voluntary  system--universal  banks  will  be  required  to  join  the  system
while all other institutions  will have the option  of joining.  In general,
voluntary  systems  tend  to  be either  private  systems  (as  in  France,  Germany,  and
"  Closing  banks is a long-standing  responsibility  of the government.
Moreover,  to avoid  losses,  the  insurer  would  have  an incentive  to close  banks
before  they  become  insolvent.31
Switzerland)  or systems  where  the  funding  has  been  switched  from  sole  reliance
on the  government  to  funding  by insured  banks  (as  in  Argentina).  In the  latter
case,  the  system  was  presumably  placed  on a  voluntary  basis  to  make the  switch
in  funding  more  palatable.  The  DIS in  Spain  is technically  a  voluntary  system,
but  there  is  a strong  incentive  for  banks  to  join  the  system  because  membership
is  a  prerequisite  for  receiving  any  kind  of financing  from  the  Central  Bank.
The major arguments  in favor of a voluntary  system are essentially
philosophical  and  political  in  nature. Requiring  banks  to  be insured  involves
a greater  degree  of government  intervention  in  the  financial  system  than  merely
providing  insurance  to  ba.-cs  on  a  voluntary  basis. Also,  in  some  countries  where
banks  are  owned  by  lower  levels  of  government,  it  may  be  politically  awkward  for
a  national  government  to  compel  these  banks  to  join  the  deposit  insurance  system.
With a voluntary system,  potential inter-governmental  conflicts regarding
membership  in the  system  are  avoided.
The  major  disadvantage  of a  volunzary  system  is  that  it  could  exacerbate
banking  instability.  The  reason  is  that  a  voluntary  system  is  likely  to  produce
a two-tiered  banking system--one  part protected  and the other unprotected.
During  tranquil  times,  some  depositors  (presumably  larger,  more sophisticated
depositors)  are  likely  to  prefer  holding  their  deposits  at unprotected  banks  in
order to obtain the higher deposit rates that these banks would offer to
compensate  depositors  for the greater  risk.  During  a crisis,  however,  the
risk/return  preference  of these  depositors  is likely  to shift  dramatically  and
result  in  their  transferring  deposits  from  unprotected  to  protected  banks.  These
deposit  shifts  could  be large  and  could  put  a  considerable  strain  on the  lender
of last  resort. If the lender  of last  resort  could  not  handle  the liquidity
crisis,  unprotected  banks  could  be forced  to  sell  large  amounts  of assets  in  a32
disorderly  market  at  If  ire  sale"  prices.  The  resulting  erosion  of  equity  capital
could  produce  numerous  insolvencies.  In sum,  a voluntary  system  is likely  to
be inherently  unstable,  producing  large  scale  deposit  shifts  between  protected
and  unprotected  banks,  depending  on  the  state  of  public  confidence  in  the  banking
system. Protected  banks  would  ride  the .ablic  confidence  cycle  anticyclically
while  unprotected  banks  would  ride  it  procyclically.
A  voluntary  system  also  could  produce  problems  because  its  membership  may
be  unstable.  For  example,  well  regarded  banks  might  choose  to  withdraw  from  the
system  if  bank  failures  rose  sharply  and  large  special  premium  assessments  were
levied  in order  to replenish  the insurance  fund.  These  withdrawals  from the
system  would  tend  to  throw  an even  greater  financial  burden  on those  less  well
regarded  banks that felt that they could  not survive  outside the insurance
system.
There  are  several  other  less  serious  problems  with  a  voluntary  DIS. First,
a voluntary  system  is unlikely  to extend  protection  to all small  depositors
because  at  least  some  banks  may  stay  out  of the  system. If  so,  one  of the  major
objectives  of  a  DIS,  to  protect  small  depositors,  would  not  be  achieved.  Second,
in  initially  designing  a  voluntary  DIS  and  changing  some  of  the  features  of  such
a system  over  time,  policy  makers  would  always  have to  consider  the  effects  of
their  decisions  on membership  and the  resulting  robustness  of the  DIS.  This
factor  could  act  as a constraint  and  force  policy  makers  into  trade-offs  that
could  result  in  a less  well  designed  system. By contrast,  a compulsory  system
introduces  no such  constraints  into  the  decision  making  process.
While  there  appears  to  be a  strong  case  for  having  a  compulsory  DIS,  some
would  argue  that  in a mixed  banking  system,  government-owned  banks  should  not
be compelled  to  join a DIS.  One reason  is that  government-owned  banks  do not33
need  insurance  to  protect  depositors  because  the  government  will  not  allow  these
banks  to  fail. Another  reason  is  that  the  insurer,  if  owned  by the  government,
in  some  instances  might  give  government-owned  banks  better  treatment  than  private
banks.
The  counterargument  is that  in  a  mixed  banking  system  public  and  private
banks  must  be  given  parallel  treatment  in  order  to  maintain  competitive  equality.
Consequently,  if  private  banks  are  compelled  to  join  the  DIS,  public  banks  also
should  be required  to  join. If this  is  not  done,  both  types  of  banks  would  end
up  with  some  form  of  deposit  protection  (private  banks  through  deposit  insurance
and public  banks through  likely  government  bailouts),  but only private  banks
would  have to  pay  for  the  protection  (through  insurance  premiums).
It  is  possible  that  if  government-owned  banks  are  included  in  the  DIS,  they
might  receive  preferential  treatment  by a government-owned  insurer. However,
this  argument  is  weakened  by the  fact  that  the  government,  if it  wanted,  could
favor  public  banks over.  private  banks through  other channels--for  example,
through  more  lenient  supervisory  treatment,  favored  tax  treatment,  lower  reserve
requirements,  and  so forth.
Single  versus  Hultiple  Funds
In most countries  that have a DIS, one fund is used for all types  of
institutions  included  in the insurance  program.  However,  in Germany  and the
United  States  different  funds  are  used  to  insure  different  types  of  institutions.
In  the  case  of Germany,  separate  funds  exist  for  commercial  and  mortgage  banks
on the  one  hand,  and  savings  banks  and  regional  giro  institutions  on the  other.
In the United  States,  three  different  funds  are employed  for, respectively,
commercial  banks,  savings  institutions  and  credit  unions.34
One argument  for setting  up separate  funds  is that different  types  of
institutions  may  have  different  risk  profiles. Consequently,  in  order  to  avoid
having  relatively  low  risk  institutions  cross-subsidizing  relatively  high  risk
institutions,  it is necessary  to set up separate  funds for each class of
institution. However,  setting  up multiple  funds  goes against  the grain  of
insurance,  which  is premised  on the  concept  of risk diversification.  Indeed,
a  scheme  devoted  exclusively  to institutions  that  are  exposed  to the  same  types
of  risks  is  particularly susceptible  to  exogenous shocks.  Thus,  the
fragmentation  of DISs is  to  be avoided.
The problem  of potential  cross-subsidization  in a single  fund  could  be
handled  in  either  of two  ways:  (i)  by charging  differential  insurance  premiums
based on an institution's  overall risk profile; or  (ii) by  implementing
differential  capital requirements  that bring the overall risk profile of
different  institutions  into  balance.
Amount  of Insurance  Coverage
The  amount  of insurance  protection  extended  to individual  depositors  is
an  important  feature  of  a  DIS. Indeed,  it  probably  has  more  to  do  with  the  basic
character  and the  ultimate  effects  of the system  than any other  feature. As
discussed  earlier,  insurance  protection  can  take  the  form  of  de  jure  protection
--  the  amount  of protection  that  the  insurer  is legally  obligated  to extend  to
depositors  in the  event of a bank failure  --  and de facto  protection  --  the
protection  that the insurer  effectively  extends  to uninsured  depositors  by
resolving  a failure  in  a  way that  protects  all  depositors  from  losses.
As shown in Table 3, the  maximum  amount  of de jure protection  offered
depositors  varies widely from country to country.  Yugoslavia  and Norway
currently  grant  unlimited  protection  --  that  is,  they  employ  a  100  percent35
insurance  system.  For those  countries  that set a ceiling,  the ceiling  is
generally  much higher  for  developed  countries  than for developing  countries,
reflecting  in part the higher average deposit balances in the developed
countries.
In several  countries  there  are  certain  caveats  that  apply  to the  stated
amount  of insurance  protection  that expand  or contract  actual  coverage.  In
Argentina  (after  1979)  and  in  Chile  (under  that  country's  complementary  scheme
where  depositors  voluntarily  could  purchase  insurance  above  the  limit),  deposits
are  partially  covered  above  the  ceiling--90  percent  in  Argentina  and  75  percent
in Chile.  In other  systems,  including  Argentina's  and the  proposed  system  in
Brazil,  the  ceiling  is indexed  so that  coverage  will increase  with inflation.
In most  other  countries,  the  ceiling  is  modified  from time  to time  to reflect
changes  in the  price  level,  the  financial  status  of the  insurance  fund,  and/or
the  country's  policy  goals. In Belgium,  the  amount  of coverage  can  be reduced
if  the  insurance  fund  is  not large  enough  to satisfy  all  claims. Finally,  the
United  Kingdom  has employed  the concept  of co-insurance  by insuring  only 75
percent  of the  deposit  balance. With this  system,  therefore,  there  is always
some risk sharing  between  depositors  and the insurer,  thereby  instilling  a
considerable  degree  of  market  discipline  into  the  banking  system.
In a majority  of DISs in the developing  countries,  the insurer  has
authority  to prevent  a failure  by rehabilitating  a troubled  bank or arranging
for  a financially  assisted  merger. This  authority  gives  insurers  in these
countries  the  power  to extend  de facto  protection  to uninsured  depositors,  at
least  under  certain  circumstances.36
Table  3
Maximum  Coverage  Rer  DORositOr
1988
Local  Currency  US$  US$
Country  Year  Value  Value  Value
Argentina  1988  A  81,000  8,416  8,416
Austria  1986  AS  200,000  13,100  14,116
Belgium  1985  BF  500,000  8,421  9,248
Brazil  1988  OTN  3,500  16,500  17,780
Canada  1986  C$  60,000  43,181  46,530
Chile  1977  t.u.  100  1,000  1,949
Chile  (comp.)  1981  t.u.  250  5,061  6,576
Colombia  1988  Col$ 200,000  668  668
France  1985  FF  400,000  44,518  63,829
India  1980  Rs.  30,000  3,815  5,470
Japan  1986  Y  10,000,000  59,340  63,942
Kenya  1985  Kshs.  100,000  6,086  6,684
Netherlands  1986  Fi  35,000  14,286  15,394
Nigeria  1988  N  50,000  10,860  10,860
Norway  unlimited  unlimited
Philippines  1988  P  40,000  1,896  1,896
Spain  1981  ptasl,500,000  16,248  21,111
Switzerland  1984  SF  30,000  12,768  14,521
Turkey  1983  TL  3,000,000  13,306  15,779
UK  1982  pds.  10,000  17,505  21,424
uS  1980  US$  100,000  100,000  143,379
Yugoslavia  unlimited  unlimited
NOTES:
The  year  listed  is  the  latest  year  that  the  ceiling  was  modified  (to  the  amount
specified  in the  first  column). This  amount  was converted  to  US dollars  using
the average  exchange  rate  for that  year.  Finally,  this  was reflated  to 1988
dollars  using  the  US CPI. Thus,  the  last  column  specifies  the  1988  dollar  value
of  the  coverage  ceiling  at  the  last  time  it  was  changed,  and  no  the  dollar  value
of the  ceiling  in  effect  in  1988. Thus,  if  one takes  the  US as an  example,  the
ceiling  was set in 1980  to  what  would  now  be $143,379. Since  then,  the  value
of the  ceiling  has depreciated  by 30S. The source  for  exchange  rates  and the
CPI  is the  IMF's  International  Financial  Statistics.37
Policy  Implications  of  Alternative  Scheme.
For  purposes  of analyzing  the  policy  implications  of different  coverage
schemes,  we will return  to the  three  coverage  arrangements  reviewed  earlier  in
the  study-  -limited  coverage,  100  percent  insurance,  and  discretionary  coverage.
Most of the  coverage  schemes  actually  being  used  by developing  and developed
countries  closely  parallel  one  of these  three  arrangements.
A  limited  coverage  scheme  would  fully  protect  small  depositors  because  the
coverage  limit  is expressly  set  to accomplish  this result. However,  limited
coverage  would  give  the  banking  system  only  partial  protection  against  contagious
bank runs  because  some  depositors  would  not  be fully  insured  and  would  have an
incentive  to start  a run  on  banks  perceived  to  be in  trouble. Moreover,  these
large  depositors  are likely  to be the most sophisticated  and best informed
depositors.
While  limited  coverage  gives  the  banking  system  only  partial  protection
against runs, it preserves  a  considerable  degree of market discipline  by
depositors,  thereby  helping  to  constrain  bank  risk-taking.  When  banks  fail  and
insurance  coverage  is limited,  those  depositors  who are not fully  protected
become  general  creditors  in the  receivership.  As general  creditors,  they  will
presumably  sustain  at  least  some  loss,  with  the  amount  of  the  loss  depending  on
the  liquidation  value  of the  assets  in the  receivership.
Limited coverage  results in two types of inequities.  First, small
depositors  obviously  receive  preferertial  treatment  compared  to  large  depositors.
Secondly,  some  banks  benefit  from  limited  coverage  more  than  others,  depending
on the  percentage  of their  total  deposits  that are insured. Since  insurance
lowers  the  risk  of deposits,  the  cost  of insured  deposits  should  be lower  than
for  uninsured  deposits,  other  things  being  equal. Consequently,  banks  with a38
high  percentage  of  deposits  that  are  insured  would  tend  to  have  a  lower  cost  of
funds  than  banks  with  a low  percentage.  This  funding  advantage,  however,  could
be offset  if  banks  were  required  to  pay insurance  premiums  based  on the  amount
of  their  insured  deposits,  and  the  premium  rate  were  set  at  a level  equal  to  the
cost  of funds  savings.
With 100  percent  insurance,  all  depositors,  both small  and large,  would
be fully  protected  against  loss.  Moreover,  full  coverage  would  offer  the  banking
system  a  high  level  of  protection  against  contagious  bank  runs  because  depositors
would  have no incentive  to start  a run,  so long  as they  retained  faith  in the
ability  of the  insurer  to  meet  its  obligations  when  banks  failed. On the  other
hand, 100 percent insurance  would eliminate  markes discipline  because all
depositors  would be fully  protected.  As a result  of this loss of market
discipline,  banks  would  tend  to  take  greRter  risks  than  they  would  with  limited
coverage  or in the  absence  of deposit  insurance.
A 100  *ercent  insurance  system  would  have no inequitable  effects.  All
depositors  and  all  banks  would  be treated  equally  because  all  deposits  would  be
insured. No bank  would  gain  a cost  of funds  advantage  over  another.
Like  the  other  two  forms  of  deposit  insurance,  the  discretionary  coverage
system  would  fully  protect  small  depositors. In  addition,  it  would  offer  the
banking  system  substantial  protection  against  runs  because  the insurer  could
protect  all  depositors  in  a  time  of  crisis. This  protection,  however,  would  not
be as complete  as with  100  percent  insurance  because  the  insurer  might  fail  to
recognize  an  emerging  crisis  and  fail  to  extend  the  protection  needed  to  preserve
public  confidence.
The discretionary  coverage  arrangement  would  have an adverse  effect  on
market discipline  that would lie somewhere  between the other two coverage39
schemes.  Small  depositors  would  be totally  protected  and,  therefore,  would  have
no incentive  to discipline  banks.  However,  these  depositors  typically  do not
have sufficient  knowledge  to evaluate  effectively  the financial  condition  of
individual  banks.  Consequently,  the loss of market  discipline  from fully
protecting  these  depositors  would  not  be  great.  A  more  serious  loss  would  result
from  extending  potential  protection  to  knowledgeable  large  depoaitors.
Discretionary  coverage  would produce inequities  in the case of both
depositors  and banks.  Small  depositors  would  be protected  in all failures,
whereas  large  depositors  would  be protected  only if a failure  t0-satened  the
stability  of the  banking  system. Extension  of  de  facto  protection  would  be  more
likely  with  large  failing  banks  than  with  small  failing  banks. This  would  favor
depositors  in large  banks  and  would tend  to give large  banks a cost of funds
advantage  over  small  banks  in  the  market  for  large  deposits.
In weighing the pros and  cons of  the three alternative  coverage
arrangements,  policy  makers  should  consider  two  important  factors  not  previously
discussed. The first  is the  extent  that  stepped  up bank supervision  could  be
substituted  for  the  erosion  of  market  discipline  from  extensive  or  full  insurance
coverage. For example,  it is conceivable  that  supervisors  could  fully  offset
the  erosion  of  market  discipline  by imposing  higher  capital  standards  for  banks
or  by subjecting  bank  lending  and  investment  practices  to  more  stringent  review.
Unfortunately,  however,  the  quality  of  bank  supervision  in  developing  countries
(as  measured  by the  thoroughness  of the  supervisory  process  and  the  willingness
of supervisory  authorities  to take strong  action)  varies considerably  from
country  to  country,  and  in  some  countries  it  may  be  difficult  to  offset  the  loss
of  market  discipline  by stepped  up oank  supervision.40
It  is  also  possible  that  the  loss  of  market  discipline  could  be offset  by
imposing  risk-adjusted  insurance  premiums.  Such premiums would act as a
disincentive  for  banks  to  take  undue  risks.  However,  as  will  be  discussed  later,
there  are major  practical  problems  with implementing  risk-adjusted  premiums.
Consequently,  this  method  for  offsetting  the  loss  of  market  discipline  may  not
be feasible.
The second  consideration  relates  to bank runs and the lender  of last
resort.  In recent  years,  a number  of scholars,  particularly  in the United
States,  have argued  that  deposit  insurance  is  not needed  to prevent  bank runs
because  an  effective  lender  of last  resort  can  handle  such  runs  if  they  occur. 14
This  view is  based  on the  assumption  that  bank runs take  the form  of deposit
transfers  from  weak  banks  to  strong  banks. These  deposit  transfers  would  result
in no change  in aggregate  bank reserves  and, therefore,  would not produce  a
change  in the  money  supply  or interest  rates.  Consequently,  the  only action
that  the  lender  of last  resort  (presumably  the  Central  Bank)  has to take  is to
lend  to  any  weak  banks  that  become  .liquid, and  offset  the  resulting  increase
in bank reserves through open market sales or  an  increase in  reserve
requirements.
The  problem  with  this  argument  is  that  things  may  not  work  out  as  smoothly
as assumed.  First,  the  bank run may take the form  of a flight  to currency,
rather  than  deposit  transfers.  If  so,  aggregate  bank  reserves  would  be  reduced,
and it would be up to the Central  Bank to offset this loss promptly  and
effectively,  or run the risk  of a sharp  decline  in the  money supply  and the
14  For  example,  see  Anna  J. Schwartz,  Financial  Stability  and  the  Federal
Safety  Not.  American  Enterprise  Institute  for  Public  Policy  Research,  November
1987,  and  George  J.  Benston  and  George  G.  Kaufman,  Risk  and  Solvency  Regulation
2f Degository Institutions:  Past Policies and Current Options. American
Enterprise  Institute  for  Public  Policy  Research,  November,  1987.41
level  of economic  activity.  Second,  weak banks that experience  large  scale
deposit  withdrawals  would  have to  borrow  extensively  from  the  Central  Bank  and
might  run  out of collateral  that  is  acceptable  to the  Central  Bank  before  the
run  ceases.
Conclusion
As discussed  earlier,  the decision  regard1-g  the amount  of insurance
coverage  is a crucial  factor  in constructing  a DTS.  The qppropriate  coverage
arrangement  depends  on  a number  of  institutional  and  policy  considerations,  and
these  considerations  could  vary significantly  from one developing  country  to
another.  Of  the  three  coverage  arrangements  considered  in  this  study,  we  believe
that  one --  100  percent  insurance  -- should  be avoided  because  it involves  an
untenable  amount  of moral  hazard. This factor  is  undoubtedly  the  reason  that
almost  all  nations  that  have  created  DISs  have  opted  for  less  than  full  deposit
coverage.  The  real choice, therefore,  is between limited coverage and
discretionary  coverage. The  advantage  of a discretionary  system  is  that,  if  a
contagious  bank run  begins,  the  nation  has an institutional  mechanism  already
in place  to stem the  bank run,  assuming  that the DIS  has adequate  financial
resources  to stem the  run. With a limited  coverage  system,  this  mechanism  is
not in place.  Consequently,  a nation  would  have to resort  to either  of two
alternatives: (1) try to stop the run by quickly  implementing  an implicit
protection  system  that  would  protect  uninsured  depositors;  or (2)  continue  to
expose  uninsured  depositors  to  potential  losses  and  rely  on the  lender  of last
resort  mechanism  to  handle  the  run,  irrespective  of  the  size  or  form  of  the  run.42
Types  of Deoosits  Covered
In  addition  to  determining  the  amount  of insurance  coverage  to  extend  to
depositors,  a nation  must  decide  what types  of deposits  should  be included  and
excluded  from  coverage. In  many  existing  deposit  insurance  systems,  some  or  all
of  the  following  types  of  deposits  are  excluded  from  coverage:  foreign  deposits
of  domestic  banks;  domestic  deposits  of foreign  banks;  interbank  deposits;  and
deposits  denominated  in  foreign  currencies.
The four types of deposits  listed  above are usually J.AM  deposits.
Consequently,  with coverage  schemes  that limit  coverage  to relatively  small
deposit  amounts,  it  does  not  make  much  difference  whether  these  types  of  deposits
are  included  or excluded  from  coverage.
Foreign  DeRosits  of Dogestic  Banks
The  major  reason  for  covering  the  foreign  deposits  of domestic  banks is
that these  deposits  are  as susceptible  to a run as deposits  held in domestic
offices. Since  one of the  objectives  of deposit  insurance  is to  prevent  bank
runs,  the  exclusion  of foreign  deposits  would  run  counter  to the  purpose  of the
system.
There  are  several  arguments  for  excluding  foreign  deposits  from  coverage.
First,  such  deposits  basically  are  not  part  of the  domestic  banking  system,  the
domestic  money  supply  or  domestic  savings.  Second,  a  higher  percentage  of these
foreign  deposits  are likely  to be held by non-residents  than in the case of
domestic  deposits. Consequently,  the  government  may be less concerned  about
protecting  these  deposits  than  domestic  deposits. Third,  it is possible  that
foreign  deposits  of domestic  banks  may  be insured  by the  host  country. If  so,
insuring  these foreign deposits  would result in double coverage,  and some43
arrangement  obviously  would  have  to  be  worked  out  to  avoid  paying  off  depositors
twice  in the  event  of a  bank  failure.
In most  developing  countries,  the  weight  of the  considerations  probably
would favor  n  insuring  the forelgn  d.posLts  of domestic  banks.  The major
factor  is that  these  deposits  are  not  part  of the  nation's  banking  and  monetary
system.
Domestic  Deposits  of ForeiLgn  Banks
The  major  reason  for  insuring  the  domestic  deposits  of foreign  banks  is
that  they  are  part  of the  domestic  banking  and  monetary  system  --  a significant
part  in  some  developing  countries.  Also,  by establishing  the  same  ground  rules
for domestic  and foreign  banks,  the efficiency  of the  banking  system  may be
enhanced. Finally,  in those  countries  where foreign  banks  conduct  an active
retail  business,  the  exclusion  of their  deposits  from  coverage  would  result  in
some  small  depositors  in the  country  not  being  insured.
The  main  argument  against  insuring  the  domestic  deposits  of foreign  banks
stems  from  the  general  proposition  that  deposit  insurance  should  be  extended  only
to  banks  that  can  be examined  by the  nation's  supervisory  authorities.  In  many
cases,  foreign  banks  are  represented  in a developing  country  by a branch. In
this  case,  the  developing  country  is faced  with a difficult  situation  because
it  makes  no sense  to  examine  the  domestic  branch  of  a foreign  bank. Typically,
this branch  would constitute  only a small part of the foreign  bank's  total
operations,  and would have little  effect on the bank's overall financial
condition. This situation  leaves  the  developing  country  with three  choices:
insure  the  branch  without  the  benefit  of  detailed  knowledge  of  the  foreign  bank's
condition;  exclude  the  branch  from  insurance  coverage;  or require  all  foreign
banks  to  operate  in  the  country  through  separately  incorporated  domestic  banks44
that  can  be effectively  examined  and  evaluated. The  problem  with  requiring  a
foreign  banking  organization  to  set  up  a  domestic  bank  is  that  this  bank  probably
would  be more susceptible  to  failure  than  would  a foreign  bank  with  a domestic
branch. The  reason  is  that  the  domestic  bank  would  be less  diversified  and  may
have to operate  in a less stable  economic  environment. The offset  to this
argument,  however,  is that  the  foreign  banking  organization  might  support  its
domestic  bank if  it ran into trouble in order to preserve the foreign
organization's  reputation.
If  a  foreign  bank  is  represented  in  a  developing  country  by  a  branch,  there
is also the problem  of double  coverage  if these  deposits  are insured  in the
foreign bank's own country.  This potential  problem could be resolved  by
excluding  domestic  deposits  of foreign  banks from  coverage  where  such double
coverage  exists.
The balance  of the  considerations  seems  to favor  insuring  the  domestic
deposits  of foreign  banks,  primarily  because  these  deposits  constitute  part  of
the  domestic  banking  and  monetary  system. Most  nations  with  deposit  insurance
systems  do insure  these  deposits.
Interbank  Denosits
The  rationale  for  excluding  interbank  deposits  from  coverage  is  that  banks
are likely  to be particularly  well informed  regarding  the  financial  condition
and  operations  of other  banks.  Consequently,  these  banks  constitute  the  best
potential  source  of  market  discipline,  and  by  excluding  interbank  deposits  from
coverage,  this  market  discipline  is  retained.
There  are  two  arguments  against  excluding  interbank  deposits. First,  it
significantly  increases  the likelihood  of bank runs  because  the  best informed
depositors  in the  nation  would  be unprotected. Second,  if interbank  deposits45
are  not covered  and  a bank fails,  those  banks that  still  had deposits  in the
failing  bank  would  sustain  losses. These  losses  would  weaken  these  banks  and,
depending  on  the  size  of the  deposits,  could  cause  them  to  fail. Given  the  goal
of  deposit insurance to  promote banking stability, this  result seems
counterproductive  and  could  increase  the  total  cost  to the  insurer.
At present,  a slight  majority  of developing  countries  exclude  interbank
deposits  from coverage.  Among the developed  countries,  a somewhat  greater
majority  exclude  such  deposits. On balance,  we believe  that it is better  to
include  interbank  deposits.
Deposits  Denominated  in  a Foreign  Currency
In  some  countries,  the  deposit  insurance  system  does  not  cover  the  deposits
of insured  banks  that  are  denominated  in  a  foreign  currency.  One  reason  is  that
these deposits are  not  viewed as  part  of  the  domestic money  supply.
Consequently,  it is perceived  that they need not be insured  to protect  the
payments  mechanism.  Another reason particularly  applicable  to developing
countries  is that the insurer  might not be able to acquire  needed  foreign
exchange  in order  to pay off holders  of foreign  currency  deposits. In that
event,  the  holders  of foreign  currency  deposits  would  force  the insurer  into
bankruptcy  for  failing  to  honor  its  obligations.
One  way  to  handle  the  problem  of  a  possible  deficiency  of  foreign  exchange
is  to give  the  insurer  legal  authority  to  pay  off  foreign  currency  deposits  in
local.  currency  at the  existing  exchange  rate.  This  procedure  would  allow  the
deposit  insurance  system  to insure  deposits  denominated  in foreign  currencies
safely. The  problem  with this  solution  is that  the  existing  exchange  rate  in
the  nation  may  not  be  realistic  and  could  result  in  the  foreign  currency  holders
suffering  substantial  losses.46
Financing  Degosit  Insurance
There are two major questions  that must be resolved  relating  to the
financing  of deposit  insurance. First,  who should  bear the  costs  of deposit
insurance--that  is,  when  depositors  are  protected  from  loss,  who  should  absorb
these  losses? And second,  how should  the financing  of deposit  insurance  be
arranged? Should  an insurance  fund  be set  up and, if  so,  how large  should  the
fund  be?
Allo.eating  the  Costs
In  most existing  deposit  insurance  systems,  the  costs  of protection  are
absorbed  ultimately  by insured  banks  in the form  of required  premium  payments
into the insurance  fund.  The primary  rationale  for allocating  the  costs  of
deposit  insurance  to  the  banks  is  that  they  are  the  direct  beneficiaries  of  the
system. Deposit  insurance  lowers  the  risk  of  deposits  and  results  in  a  decrease
in banks'  cost of funds.  Some observers  also would  argue that  banks should
absorb  the  costs  because  banks  produce  the  losses  that  must  be covered.
However,  there  are  two  problems  with  requiring  banks  ultimately  to absorb
all  of the  costs  of deposit  insurance.  First,  the  deposit  insurance  system  may
experience  very large  losses  during  a banking  crisis.  If so,  the  costs  passed
on to the  banks  may seriously  erode  their  capital  and  push some of them into
insolvency.  Second, the  benefits  accruing  to  banks  from  insurance  may  bear  no
close  relationship  to  the  costs. If the  costs  exceed  the  benefits.  the  deposit
insurance  system,  in  effect,  would  be imposing  a wtax"  on the  banks.
In  some  deposit  insurance  systems,  the  government,  in  one  form  or  another,
shares  some  of the  cost  burdens  with the  banks. For  example,  in  India,  Nigeria
and  the  Philippines,  the  government  made  an  initial  capital  contribution  to  the
deposit  insurance  fund  that  could  help  to  absorb  possible  future  losses. Using47
a  different  approach,  the  government  in  Spain  shares  the  cost  burdens  by  saki-ng
regular  contributions  to  the  insurance  fund  that  match  the  aggregate
contributions  provided  by  the  banking  sector.
There  are  also  a  small  number  of  deposit  insurance  systems  (Yugoslavia  is
a good example)  where the costs  of the system  are absorbed  entirely  by the
government,  thereby  conferring  a subsidy  on  banks.
From  a  risk  standpoint,  deposit  insurance  increases  the  attractiveness  of
banking  versus  non-banking  investments.  In an extreme  case,  deposit  insurance
may  be seen  as impeding  the  development  of capital  markets  by favoring  insured
debt  over  uninsured  debt and  equity. On the  other  hand, if  deposit  insurance
is  priced  so  as  to  compensate  for  the  reduction  in  risk,  this  bias  is  eliminated.
Therefore,  the  degree  to  which  a bias  is introduced  depends  on: (i)  the  degree
of substitutability  or segmentation  of such  markets;  and (ii)  whether  deposit
insurance  in  specific  cases  involves  a  tax  or  subsidy  for  the  banking  system  and
whether  such  tax  or subsidy  is  passed  on to  depositors.
Should  a Fund  be Established?
There  are  two  basic  ways  that  deposit  insurance  is financed  through  bank
contributions.  The  first  is  to  set  up  a  fund  and  require  banks  to  make  periodic
premium  payments  into  the  fund. The  other  is  to  levy  ex  post  premium  assessments
on  banks. Most  deposit  insurance  systems  have  used  the  fund  approach,  and  this
appears  to  be the  better  alternative.
One  advantage  of  creating  a  fund  is  that  it  tends  to  promote  depositor
confidence  because  there  is  something  tangible  for  insured  depositors  to  look
to  for  protection.  Another  advantage  is  that  a  fund  is  built  up over  time,  and
this  has the  important  effect  of spreading  out  the  costs  to  banks  over  time.48
Probably  the  major  advantage  of  ex  post  assessments  is  that  they  avoid  the
very difficult  problem  of determining  the  appropriate  size  of the  fund. With
ex post assessments,  there is no guess  work--the  assessment  is whatever  is
required  to pay off insured  depositors  of a  failed  bank.  Also, the ex post
assessment  approach  avoids  placing  a burden on banks if, in fact, no bank
failures  occur.
On the  other  hand,  ex post assessments  have  several  major  disadvantages
that are responsible  for their infrequent  use.  Most important,  ex post
assessments  concentrate  costs rather than spreading them out over time.
Moreover,  because  bank  failures  tend  to  occur  during  periods  of adversity,  the
concentration  of  costs  comes  at  the  worst  time. Another  problem  is  that  the  bank
that  fails  and  causes  the  assessment  to  be levied  is  the  only  bank  that  escapes
the assessment.  This result is obviously  inequitable,  especially  in those
developing  countries  where  there  are  only  a few  banks to carry  the  burden. A
third  problem  is  that  ex  post  assessments  are  likely  to  prove  unworkable  if  the
deposit  insurance  system  is placed  on a voluntary  basis.  During  a period  of
adversity  when  failures  are  likely  to  occur,  well regarded  banks  would  have  an
incentive  to  drop  out  of  the  system  in  order  to  avoid  assessments.  As  more  banks
left the system,  the potential  burden  of paying  the assessments  would fall
disproportionately  on  the  remaining  banks  in  the  system,  thereby  increasing  their
incentive  to drop out.  The end result  could  be the  collapse  of the deposit
insurance  system,  just  at the  time  that  the  system  is  most  needed.
Size  of the  Fund
It is  extremely  difficult  to determine  the  appropriate  size  of a  deposit
insurance  fund  because  it is very  hard to  predict  the number  and  the size  of
banks that  will fail over a given  period,  or the extent  that they will be49
insolvent.  About  all  that  policymakers  can do is use  their  best judgment  and
allow  for  a wide  margin  of error.
Traditionally,  policymakers  have  used the  ratio  of capital  and reserves
to insured  deposits  as their  measure  to  judge  the  adequacy  of the  fund. There
is  considerable  variation  in  the  capital  ratios  of  deposit  insurance  systems  in
existence.  Logically,  this  variation  should  reflect  differences  in  the  financial
condition  of  banks  in  the  system  and  their  concentration  of  risks. However,  it
is  apparent  that  other  factors  are  at work,  probably  including  differences  in
the  capability  of individual  nations  to fund  their  systems.
While  there  are  many  ways to arrange  the  funding  of a deposit  insurance
system,  the  following  would  be  a  reasonable  approach.  First,  an  initial  capital
contribution  should  be made to the fund,  probably  by the government.  XD
contribution  should  place  the  capital  ratio  at  a level  that  would  give  the  fund
initial  credibility  in the  eyes  of depositors. Also,  the  contribution  should
be sufficient  to  handle  failures  that  might  occur  in  a  period  of  adversity  during
the  system's  first  several  years  in  operation.
In addition  to setting an initial  capital ratio, authorities  should
establish  a range  above  this  initial  level  in  which  the  capital  ratio  would  be
allowed  to fluctuate.  Given  the  great  uncertainty  regarding  future  losses,  it
would  be  advisable  to  set  a  fairly  wide  range,  thereby  allowing  the  ratio  to  rise
to  a  relatively  high  level  before  taking  any  action  to  prevent  any  further  rise.
The lachilles  heel'  of  a deposit  insurance  system  is  catastrophic  losses
-- huge  losses  that  cause  the  system  to  become  illiquid  and/or  insolvent. If  a
system  becomes  illiquid  and the insurer  cannot  pay off depositors  of failed
banks,  depositors  of  other  banks  will  lose  confidence  in  the  system  and  may  start
bank  runs. Alternatively,  primary  supervisors  of  banks,  knowing  that  the  insurer50
would  not  be  able  to  pay  off  depositors  if  they  closed  insolvent  banks,  oight
allow  these  banks  to  remain  in  operation.  This  ls  a  very  dangerous  action
because  the  management  of  an  lnsolvent  bank  has  a  strong  incentive  to  take  hlgh
risks  in  order  to  obtain  large  returns  that  might  restore  the  bank  to  solvency.
If  these  gambles  turn  out  badly,  the  losses  that  the  lnsurer  will  sustain  when
the  bank  is  eventually  closed  wlll  be  even  greater.
Catastrophic  losses  also  may cause  the insurer  to  become  technlcally
insolvent.  It  ls  possible  for  an  insurer  to  operate  wlth  a  negative  net  worth
if it has adequate  fundlng  sources  so that  it can contlnue  to meet lts
obligations.  However,  operating  wlth  a  negatlve  net  worth  always  runs  the  risk
of  a  loss  of  depositor  confidence-  -a  loss  that  might  occur  suddenly  as  the  result
of  some  development.
It  is  the  prospect  of  catastrophic  losses  that  requires  that  the  government
play  at  least  a  backup  role  in  financing  a  deposlt  insurance  system.  First,  the
insurer  should  have  the  authority  to  borrow  from  the  Treasury  or  the  Central  Bank
in  order  to  be  able  to  honor  its  obligations.  This  borrowlng  authority  would
allow  supervisors  to  close  insolvent  banks  without  concern  that  their  action
might  produce  a  crisis  for  the  insurer,  as  well  as  the  banking  system.  Second,
the  government  should  be  authorlzed  to  inject  addltional  capital  into  the  insurer
in  order  to  preserve  depositor  confidence  in  the  system  and  to  move  the  capital
ratio  back  into  the  target  range  if  losses  should  push  the  ratio  below  the  range.
Premium  Assessment  Policy
As indicated  earlier,  most  countries  place  the  cost  burden  of  deposit
insurance  largely  or  entirely  on  the  banklng  system  ln  the  form  of  periodic
premium  payments  (and  initial  capital  contributions  in  several  countries  such
as  Colombia  and  Japan).  The  following  questions  inmolving  premium assessment51
policy  must  be addressed: (1)  what should  be the  assessment  base; (2)  should
the  assessment  rate  vary  depending  on  the  riskiness  of  individual  insured  b.  -s;
and (3)  what should  be the  level  of the  assessment  rate?
Assessment  Base
The  two  measures  that  are  the  best  candidates  to  be  used  as the  assessment
base  are  insured  deposits  and  total  deposits.  Both  measures  have  been  used,  with
insured  deposits  now being employed  in a  substantial  majority of deposit
insurance  systems  15
The  major  reason  for  using  insured  deposits  as  the  assessment  base  is  that
it  seems  fair-  -the  assessment  base  should  be the  same  as  the  amount  of  protection
being extended  to depositors.  By contrast,  using total deposits  as the
assessment  base does  not seem fair  because  in  many cases  the  assessment  base
would  exceed  (perhaps  by  a  wide  margin)  the  amount  of  protection.  1 The  use  of
total  deposits  would  result  in  inequitable  treatment  of  banks  because  some  banks
would  have higher  insured  deposits  to total  deposits  ratios  than  others  and,
therefore,  would  receive  more  protection  relative  to their  assessment  base.
The  major  reason  for  using  total  deposits  is that  banks  always  know the
amount  of their  total  deposits. Consequently,  they  can  readily  determine  and
report  their  assessment  base.  By contrast,  banks  find  it  difficult  and  costly
to  determine  the  amount  of  their  insured  deposits  because  they  may  have  to
15  Those  systems  that  do  not  use  insured  deposits  include  the  United
States,  Colombia,  and  Germany  (which  use  total  deposit),  and  Norway  (total
assets).
16  This  argument  against  using  total  deposits  as  the  assessment  base  may
not  apply  if the  deposit  insurance  system  employs  discretionary  coverage  and
failures  are  frequently  resolved  in  a  way  that  protects  all  depositors,  insured
and  uninsured  alike.52
combine  the  accounto  of individual  depositors  having  more than  one  account  at
the  bank.
It  is  important  to  note  that  a  deposit  insurance  system  should  never  select
total  deposits  as the  assessment  base  solely  because  it is larger  than  insured
de?osits  and  would  result  in  more  premium  income. The  reason  is  that  the  choice
of a smaller  assessment  base  can  be easily  offset  by using  a larger  assessment
rate.
Fixed  versus  Variable  Rates
The  assessment  rate  applied  to the  assessment  base  could  be the  same  for
all banks irrespective  of a bank's  financial  condition,  or could  be made to
depend  on the  bank's  overall  risk. This  variable  rate  approach  would  mimic  the
way premium  rates  are typically  set in the private  sector--the  greater the
insurer's  risk  exposure,  the  higher  the  premium.
From a policy  perspective,  a good case can be made for implementing  a
variable  premium  rate  structure.  The  major  reason  is  that  a  variable  rate  system
imposes  costs  on  banks  for  taking  risks,  and  hence  creates  an  incentive  for  banks
to  limit  their  risk  exposure. This  result  is  particularly  desirable  because  it
offsets,  at least  in  some  degree,  the  erosion  of  market  discipline  that  deposit
insurance  produces.  A variable  rate system  also results  in more equitable
treatment  of insured  banks.  It does  not  seem  fair  that low-risk  banks  should
have  to  pay  the  same  assessment  rate  as  high-risk  banks  when  the  latter  represent
a greater  threat  to  the  deposit  insurance  fund.
The  major  problem  with  variable  rates  is  that  they  must  be based  on some
measure of overall bank risk.  As policymakers  are generally  aware, the
measurement  of overall  bank risk is very complex  and  very difficult. First,
there  are  many  forms  of  bank  risk  and  some  of these  forms,  particularly  credit53
risk  and  fraud  risk,  are  very  difficult  to  quantify  on  an  ex  ante  basis. Second,
even  if  each  form  of  bank  risk  could  be  measured  reasonably  effectively,  it  would
be difficult  to weight  these  various  risks  in order  to establish  some  sort  of
schedule  of  variable  rates. It  also  should  be  noted  that  the  types  of risks  to
which  banks  are  exposed  tend  to shift  in  importance  over  time.
In sum,  the  measurement  problems  associated  with  establishing  a  variable
rate  system,  though  not  insurmountable,  are  nevertheless  considerable.  This  fact
undoubtedly  explains  why  virtually  no deposit  insurance  systems  employ  variable
rates,  even  though  there  are  good  reasons  for  doing  so on  policy  grounds.1"
Beyond  the  measurement  problems,  the  use  of  variable  rates  also  tends  to
have  a  perverse  effect  on  banking  stability  by increasing  premium  rates  on  those
banks  that  get  into  trouble. Such  premium  increases  would  reduce  the  earnings
of these  banks,  thereby  eroding  their  capital  at the  worst  possible  time.
Finally,  it  should  be noted  that  the  shortcomings  of fixed  premium  rates
could  be  reduced  by  varying  the  amount  of  capital  that  banks  are  required  to  hold
in order  to  bring  the  overall  risk  profile  of banks  into  greater  balance  than
would  otherwise  be the  case. However,  adjusting  the  capital  of  banks  on  a risk
basis  involves  the  same  measurement  problems  as  adjusting  insurance  premiums  on
a risk  basis.
Level_  of Assessment  Rate
As discussed  earlier,  one way to structure  the financing  of a deposit
insurance  system  is to  set  a target  range  for  the  fund's  capital  ratio  (capital
plus  reserves  to insured  deposits),  and  then  maintain  the  fund's  actual  capital
ratio  within  that  range  over time. Other  than  a  capital  injection,  there  are
17 While  not  a risk-adjusted  premium  rate  scheme,  Argentina  offers  banks  a
10  percent  premium  refund  if  a  bank  complies  with  all  regulations  throughout  the
year.54
four  major  cash  flown  that  affect  the  actual  capital  ratio--premium  payments,
investment  Lncome,  claims  payments  and  administratlve  expenses.  Of  these  four
cash  flows,  the  lnsurer  has  substantLal  control  over  only  one--premium  payments.
Once  the  assessment  base  has  been  chosen,  premiun  lncome  is  controlled  over  tlme
by  varylng  the  assessment  rate.
In  order  to  keep  the  fund's  acLual  capLtal  ratlo  wlthin  the  target  range,
the  insurer  could  change  the  assessment  rate  periodically.  Alternatively,  the
insurer  could  make premLum rebates  to  banks  when the  actual  ratio  moves  above
the  upper  end  of  the  target  range,  or  require  bank& to  make special  assessment
payments  when  the  ratio  moves  b,elow  the  lower  end  of the  target  range. As
discussed  earlier,  catastrophic  losses  that  wipe  out  the  fund  or  seriously  impair
public  confidence  in  the  fund  must be  handled  through  a  capital  injection  by  the
goverument,  not  through  large  scale  special  assessments  on  banks  that  could
seriously  erode  their  capital  and  force  some  banks  into  technical  insolvency.
In  some  existing  deposit  insurance  systems,  the  amount  of the  regular
assessment  is  modified  according  to  the  size  of  the  insurance  fund. In  Cuba,
for  example,  a certain  peso  amount  was  targeted  for  the  fund,  and  assessment
rates  depend  on  th3  deviation  of  the  actual  size  of  the  fund  from  the  target
figure.  Consequently,  the  size  of the  assessment  is  directly  related  to  the
losses  that  the  fund  sustains.  The  German  scheme  for  savings  banks  and  the
Norwegian  eheme  differ  from  the  Cuban scheme  only  in  that  the  target  for  the
fund  is  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  outstanding  claims  of  the  institutions,
rather  than  an  absolute  amount.  In  Spain  prior  to  1980,  assessments  could  be
varied  entirely  at  the  discretion  of  the  lnsurer.  In  this  case,  the  connection
between  the  size  of  the  fund  and  the  level  of  the  assessment  becomes  more
tenuous.  Llkewise,  in  some countries  assessments  can  be  increased,  depending55
on  need.  For  example,  the  German  scheme  for  coercial  banks  envisions  the
doubling  of  the  assessment  rate  under  specific  circumstances.  In  still  other
countries,  the  size  of  the fund  does  not  affect  the  level  of  assessments
directly,  but  may make  banks  eligible  for  a rebate  of  their  past  assessments.
In  Belgium,  unused  contributions  are  refunded  after  ten  years.  The  Colombian
scheme  envisions  rebates  when  the  size  of  the  fund  permits  them.  A  somewhat
different  rebate  program  is  used  in  the  Philippines,  where  60%  of  the  net  income
of  the  system  (after  paying  claims  and  expenses)  is  rebated  yearly.
Figure  1  displays  in  graphical  form  the  assessment  rates  charged  banks  in
various  countries.  As  indicated,  most  deposit  insurance  systems  charge  up  to
0.15%  of  deposits,  but  some  charge  higher  rates.  At  0.94%,  Nigeria  has  the
highest  assessment  rate  among  the  compulsory  systems.  Chile's  voluntary
complementary  scheme  charges  an even  higher  1.2%  rate,  and this  high  rate
partially  explains  why  this  complementary  scheme  never  really  developed.  It  is
clear  that  the  rates  in  developed  countries  on  the  whole  are  lower  than  those
in  many  developing  countries,  undoubtedly  reflecting  the  sounder  condition  of
banking  systems  in  developed  countries.
In  a  few  cases,  such  as  in  Colombia  and  Japan,  banks  were  required  to  make
initial  capital  contributions  to  the  fund,  in  addition  to  making  subsequent
assessment  payments.  In  the  case  of  Colombia,  capital  contributions  were
expressed  as  a  fraLtion  of  bank  reserves  and  was compensated  by  an  equal
reduction  in  the  reserve  requiremdnt.  However,  such  initial  capital
contributions  do  not  seem  to  be  popular.  The  more  common alternative  is  for  the
fund  to  borrow  heavily  in  its  earlier  stages  when  it is insufficiently
capitalized,  and  then  repay  these  debts  and  accumulate  cafital  over  time  from
higher  regular  bank  assessments"  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.56
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Conclusion
As indicated  in this section,  there  are  a variety  of arrangements  being
used to finance  deposit  insurance  in developing  and  developed  countries. In
general,  most  schemes  place  all  or  most  of  the  cost  burden  on  the  banks,  probably
in recognition  of the  benefits  that  banks  derive  from  deposit  insurance. The
major  problem  with  this  procedure  is  that  banks  may  be required  to  absorb  losses
during  a  crisis  that  are  far  beyond  their  capacity  to  sustain  them
One  alternative  way  to  structure  the  financing  of deposit  insurance  is  to
require  banks  to  pay  premiums  that  equal  the  benefits  (primarily  in the  form  of
a lower  cost  of funds)  that  banks  derive  from  deposit  insurance.  Such  a system
would  shield  banks  from  potentially  destabilizing  assessments  during  a crisis.
It also would avoid  conferring  a net tax or subsidy  on banks on account  of
deposit  insurance.
While  appealing  in theory,  this  proposal  would  be difficult  to implement
because  it  would  require  the  quantification  of the  benefits  that  banks  derive
from  deposit  insurance.  In  a  voluntary  system,  the  willingness  of  banks  to  join
the system under different  pricing arrangements  would provide information
regarding  the  benefits  as  perceived  by the  banks. However,  no  such  signals  would
emanate  from  a  compulsory  system,  and,  as  discussed  earlier,  a  deposit  insurance
system  probably  must  be  compulsory  in  order  to  be successful  over  the  long  run.
Investment  Policy
For those  DISs that involve  the  creation  of a fund,  it is necessary  to
decide  what types  of assets  should  be held by the insurer.  In making this
decision,  the  following  considerations  seem  particularly  important:58
(i)  In  order  to  preserve  the  principal  of  the  fund,  the  fund  should
invest  in  assets  that  have  relatively  little  risk  (including  credit  risk,
interest  rate  risk  and  foreign  exchange  risk).
(ii)  The  fund  should  invest  in  assets  that  are  relatively  liquid.  One
reason  is  to  assure  that  the  insurer  can  sell  the  assets  promptly  in  order  to
meet  its  obligation  to  protect  depositors.
(iii)  The  fund  should  avoid  getting  involved  in  the  -location  of  credit
among  competing  interests  in  the  private  sector.
(iv)  The  sale  of  the  assets  should  not  have  large  monetary  implications,
or should  be  appropriately  sterilized  by  the  Central  Bank.
The  types  of  assets  that  seem  to  meet  these  requirements  the  best  are
short-term  government  securities  and  foreign  exchanges  (either  in  the  form  of
short-term  foreign  bank  accounts  or  short-term  foreign  government  securities).
As  will  be  shown,  neither  of  these  assets  are  likely  to  fully  meet the  four
considerations  listed  above.  Horeover,  the  choice  between  the  two  assets
involves  policy  trade  offs,  and  the  preferred  alternative  could  depend  on
circumstances.
The acquisition  of  short-term  government  securities  normally  would  involve
little  risk  and  would  avoid  getting  the  insurer  involved  in  allocating  funds  in
the  private  sector.  However,  in  many  developing  countries  governoent  security
markets  are  relatively  thin.  Consequently,  the  sale  by  the  insurer  of  a  large
amount  of  short-term  governments  in  the  market  could  severely  depress  their
price,  thereby  inflicting  large  losses  on  the  insurer  and  disrupting  local
security  markets.  In  order  to  avoid  this  result,  the  insurer  might  want  to  sell
the  government  securities  to  the  Central  Bank. Hovever,  this  transaction,  unlike
the  sale  of  securities  to  the  public,  vould  not  reduce  the  domstic  money  supply.59
Consequently,  when  the  insurer  made  a  cash  payment  to  the  public  in  handling  a
failing  bank,  there  would  be a net increase  in the  domestic  money  supply. If
the  Central  Bank  possesses  effective  instruments  of  monetary  control  and  works
in  coordination  with  the  insurer,  it  would  be  possible  to offset  this  increase
in the  money supply. The problem  is that in many developing  countries,  the
Central  Bank  may lack  this  ability.
The  holding  of foreign  exchange  by the  fund  would  have  several  advantages
over  the  holding  of  short-term  government  securities.  First,  it  would  avoid  the
problem  of  dumping  potentially  large  amounts  of governments  on  a thin  domestic
market  (although  it  would  entail  dumping  a large  amount  of foreign  exchange  on
the  domestic  foreign  exchange  market,  which  in  developing  countries  is  generally
a  better  market  than the government  security  market).  Second,  the sale of
foreign  exchange  in the local  market  would  reduce  the  domestic  money supply,
thereby  offsetting  the increase  when the insurer  makes  a cash  payment  to the
public  in  handling  a failing  bank. On the  other  hand,  holding  foreign  exchange
would  expose  the  insurer  to foreign  exchange  risk. Moreover,  in  building  up its
holding  of foreign  exchange  over  time,  the  insurer  would  put  downward  pressure
on the  exchange  rate.
Admission  to  Insurance
In  order  to  protect  the  insurance  fund,  banks  normally  should  be required
to be in satisfactory  financial  condition  before  being allowed  into  the DIS.
In  the  case  of  newly  chartered  banks,  these  banks  should  have  adequate  capital
and  have reasonable  prospects  for  operating  profitably  within  several  years.' 8
Is  It is conon  for  new banks  to incur  losses  during  their  first  several
years of  operation until they have attained sufficient  size to operate
profitably. These  early  losses  do  not  constitute  a  major  problem  if  a  bank is
well  capitalized initially and  the  bank  makes  steady progress toward
profitability.60
In  addition,  the  management  of  the  bank  should  be experienced  and  competent  and
have  a history  of integrity  in  business  affairs.
It is possible  that  when a DIS is initially  created,  some  banks  may be
solvent,  but  below  the  standards  set  for  admission  to  the  DIS. Probably  the  best
way to  handle  this  situation  is to  grant  these  banks  admission,  subject  to the
condition  that  they  meet  normal  admission  standards  within  several  year;,  or  have
their  lnsurance  revoked. This procedure  would  give these  banks a reasonable
period  of  time  to  comply,  for  example  by raising  additional  equity  capital. The
threat  of  losing  their  insurance  would  act  as  a  strong  incentive  for  these  banks
to improve their condition.  Furthermore,  under a  compulsory  system, the
withdrawal  of insurance  would be tantamount  to the withdrawal  of a bank's
license.
Terminating  Insurance
In  addition  to  controlling  admission  to  the  deposit  insurance  system,  the
insurer  should  be authorized  to  terminate  a  bank's  insurance  for  certain  actions
that jeopardize  the fund.  More specifically,  the insurer  should  be able to
terminate  insurance  if a bank engages  in  repeated  unsafe  and  unsound  banking
practices  after  receiving  directions  from  the  insurer  and  the  primary  supervisor
to cease such practices.  In addition,  the insurer  should  be authorized  to
terminate  insurance  if  a bank repeatedly  violates  banking  laws  and  prudential
regulations.
In most countries  with a deposit  insurance  system,  the termination  of
insurance  is likely  to represent  the t death  knell  for the bank involved.
Consequently,  it  is  important  that  the  insurer's  authority  to  terminate  insurance
be used in a reasonable  manner.  The insurer  should  not be authorized  to
terminate  insurance  merely  because  a  bank  has  encountered  serious  problems  due61
to  adverse  economic  conditions  in  the  bank's  area  or  to  errors  of  judgment  on
the  part  of  the  bank'  s  management.  Koreover,  when the  insurer  terminates  a
bank' s  insurance  for  appropriate  reasons  (repeated  unsafe  and  unsound operations
or  gross  violations  of  banking  laws  and  regulations),  depositors  of  that  bank
should  be  notified  of  the  termination,  and  the  insurance  should  remain  in  for¢e
for  a  reasonable  period  of  time  to  give  depositors  an  opportunity  to  transfer
their  deposits  to  another  bank.
Handling  Bank  Failure
One of the  major  functicns  of an insurer  is  to  resolve  failing  bank
situations.  Accordlngly,  it  is  important  for  the  government  to  specify  in  ?s*
deposit  lnsurance  law  what  failure  resolution  devices  the  insurer  can  use  and
how  these  devices  should  be  employed.  In  this  section,  we  will  identify  several
important  failure  resolution  devices,  describe  how  each  device  works  and  what
are its  primary  effects,  and suggest  several  criteria  for choosing  among
alternative  devices  in  individual  failing  bank  situations.
Failure  Resolution  Devices
For  purposes  of  discussion,  we  will  focus  on  the  folloving  four  failure
resolution  devices:  insured  deposit  payoffs  or  transfers;  purchase  and  assumption
transactions;  financially  assisted  mergers;  and the  provision  of financial
assistance  to a failing  bank to prevent  its  closure. In practice,  only
relatively  robust  DISs,  such  as  those  in  the  United  States  or  Spain,  use  most
or  all  of  these  devices.  In  many  of  the  DISs  in  the  developing  countries,  only
one  or  two  of  the  above  devices  are  being  employed.
With  an  lnsured  deposit  payoff,  the  failing  bank  is  closed  and  the  insurer
reisburses  all depositors  for  the full  amount  of their  deposits  up  to  the
coverage  limit. Uninsured  depositors  and  other  general  crediters  receive  no62
payments  and  become claimants  in  the  receivership.  The  insurer  also  becomes  a
claimant  in  the  receivership,  taking  the  place  of  the  insured  depositors.  All
claimants  in  the  receivership  typically  suffer  some  loss,  as  well  as delays
before  receiving  partial  payments  from  the  receivership.  In  many  respects,  an
insured  deposit  transfer  is  similar  to  an  insured  deposit  payoff. The  basic
difference  is  that  with  an  insured  deposit  transfer,  the  insurer  arranges  for
all  of  the  insured  deposits  of  the  closed  bank  to  be  assumed  by  another  bank.
In  return  for  assuming  these  deposits,  the  assuming  bank  receives  a  cash  payment
from  the  insurer."  Typically,  the  deposits  that  the  assuming  bank  acquires  have
an  economic  value,  and  the  bank  is  willing  to  pay  a modest  premium  over  book
value  for  these  deposits.  Consequently,  the  amount  of  cash  that  the  acquiring
bank  receives  is  usually  slightly  less  than  the  book  value  of the  deposits
assumed.
With  a  purchase  and  assumption  transaction,  the  insurer  arranges  for  AU
of  the  deposits  of  a  closed  bank  to  be  transferred  to  another  bank,  along  with
some  or  all  of  the  failed  bank's  assets.  The  insurer  makes  up  for  the  difference
between  the  book  value  of the  deposits  and the  market  value  of the  assets
transferred  by giving  cash  to  the  assuming  bank,  less  any  premium  that  the
assuming  bank  is  willing  to  pay  for  the  deposits.
Having  the  assuming  bank  acquire  at  least  some  of  the  assets  of  the  failing
bank  avoids  having  these  assets  end  up  in  the  receivership,  where  they  must  be
liquidated,  often  at  unfavorable  prices.  The  disadvantage  of  transferring  assets
to the  assuming  bank  is  that  the  bank  will  want  to  carefully  evaluate  these
assets,  particularly  the loans.  This  evaluation  process  could  delay  the
19  It  also  may be  possible  for  the  assuming  bank  to  acquire  some  of  the
assets  of  the  failing  bank.  If  so,  these  assets  reduce  the  amount of  cash  that
the  insurer  pays  the  acquiring  bank.63
resolution  of  the  failing  bank.  A key  factor  in  a purchase  and  assumption
transaction  is that  afl  depositors  (both  insured  and  uninsured)  are  fully
protected  from  any  losses.  As  a  result,  the  transaction  tends  to  preserve  public
confidence  in  the  banking  system,  but  also  erodes  market  discipline.  A  purchase
and  assumption  transaction  also  say  give  the  borrowers  of  the  failing  bank  some
comfort  because  they  may  be  able  to  establish  an  on-going  relationship  with  the
assuming  bank  if  that  bank  acquLres  the  borrowers'  loans.
Rather  than  arrange  a  purchase  and  assumption  transaction  after  a  bank  has
failed,  the  insurer  might  arrange  for  the  merger  of  the  bank  before  it  is  closed.
In  arranging  such  a  merger,  the  insurer  and  the  acquiring  bank  would  have  to
negotiate  the  terms  of  the  deal,  including  the  amount  and  form  of  the  payment
that  the  insurer  would  have  to  make  to  encourage  the  acquiring  bank  to  take  over
an  insolvent  institution.  The  effects  of  a financially  assisted  merger  are
similar  to  a  purchase  and  assumption  transaction--all  depositors  are  protected,
thereby  preserving  public  confidence,  but  market  discipline  is  eroded.  Also,
the  community  involved  would  continue  to  receive  banking  services,  because  the
offices  of  the  failing  bank  typically  would  be  converted  into  branches  of  the
acquiring  bank  (as  they  usually  are  in  the  case  of  a purchase  and  assumption
transaction).  A  major  problem  with  trying  to  use  financially  assisted  mergers
(as  well  as  purchase  and  assumption  transactions)  in  some  developing  countries
is  that  there  may  be  no  bank  that  is  sufficiently  sound  to  make  the  acquisition.
Even  if  such  banks  exist,  they  may  be  unwilling  to  make  the  acquisition,  at  least
on  terms  that  are  acceptable  to  the  insurer.  Moreover,  as  with  a  purchase  and
assumption  transaction,  the  acquiring  bank  will  want  to  carefully  evaluate  the
failing  bank.  Indeed, the loss of  time with  a merger is likely to be
significantly  greater  than  for  a purchase  and  assumption  transaction.  The  reason64
is that in a merger  the  bank acquires  AUl of the  assets  of the failing  bank,
whereas  in a  purchase  and  assumption  transaction  the  assuming  bank  may  acquire
only  relatively  'cleanw  assets  that  do not  require  as careful  an  evaluation.
Finally,  the insurer  could address a failing situation  by providing
financial  assistance  to  the  bank in  order  to  prevent  its  failure. This  device
is most likely  to be used when all depositors  must be protected  to preserve
public  confidence,  and a purchase  and assumption  transaction  or financially
assisted  merger  either  is not feasible  or is  not  authorized  under  the  deposit
insurance  law.  The  financial  assistance  that  the insurer  provides  can  take  a
variety  of  forms,  depending  on  circumstances.  If  the  bank  is  merely  experiencing
a  liquidity  problem  that  cannot  be resolved  by borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank,
the  insurer  could  provide  liquidity  in the  form  of a loan  or making  a deposit
in the bank.  More frequently,  however,  the bank will be experiencing  an
insolvency  problem. In  this  event,  the  insurer  might  make an  equity  injection
in the  bank.  Alternatively,  the  insurer  could  acquire  some  of the  bank's  non-
performing  assets  at  p,  giving  the  bank  either  cash  or  government  securities.
This transaction  is tantamount  to the injection  of equity,  and has the added
advantage  of giving  the  bank a fresh  start  by removing  the bad assets  that
otherwise  would  have to be worked  out.  In providing  support  to an insolvent
bank,  the  insurer  typically  would  acquire  an  equity  position  that  would  make  it
the dominant  shareholder. The insurer  also would  normally  replace  previous
management  that,  at least  in  part,  was  responsible  for  the  insolvency.  From  the
perspective  of the  public,  the  effects  of  a  financial  assistance  transaction  are
similar  to the insurer  arranging  a  purchase  and assumption  transaction  or a
merger--all  depositors  are  protected  (thereby  preserving  public  confidence  but65
eroding  market  discipline)  and  the  community  continues  to  be  served  (in  this  case
by the  same  bank).
Statutory  Provisions
In  creating  a  DIS,  the  government  should  include  provisions  in  the  deposit
insurance  law  relating  to  failure  resolution  devices.  Moreover,  these  provisions
should  assure  that the devices  used by the insurer  are consistent  with the
objectives  and  form  of  the  DIS. An  example  will  illustrate  this  point. Suppose
that  a  nation  is  establishing  a  limited  coverage  DIS,  which  is  expressly  designed
to  protect  small  depositors,  but  expose  large  depositors  to  potential  losses  in
order  to  maintain  market  discipline. In  this  event,  the  deposit  insurance  law
should  prevent the insurer  from using failure  resolution  devices,  such as
purchase  and assumption  transactions,  mergers  and financial  assistance,  that
extend  de facto  protection  to  uninsured  depositors.
There  are  two  ways  that  failure  resolution  provisions  can  be specified  in
the deposit  insurance  law.  One way is simply  to list the  devices that the
insurer  can  use. The  other  way  is  to  include  general  language  that  requires  the
insurer  to use  only those  devices  that  are  consistent  with the  objectives  and
form of the system.  In general,  the latter  approach  may be  the better
alternative  because  it would give the insurer  the flexibility  to employ  new
devices  over time  as business  practices  change  and  as innovations  in  handling
fail-ing  bank  situations  are  developed.
In addition  to specifying  the  types  of failure  resolution  devices  to be
used, the  deposit  insurance  law should  specify  the criteria  that the insurer
should  consider  in  choosing  amor.n  alternative  authorized  devices.  In  many  DISs,
the  sole  or  dominant  consideration  is  cost  minimization.  Some  failure  resolution
devices  tend  to  be  more  cost  effective  than  others  because  they  tend  to  preserve66
the  value  of the  failing  bank's  assets. These  assets  may lose  a considerable
portion  of their  value  if  they  are thrown  into  a receivership  an-i  then  sold  at
"fire  sale'  prices. Alternatively,  if  these  assets  are  transferred  to another
bank as the  result  of a purchase  and  assumption  transaction  or a merger,  the
acquiring  bank  may  be  able  to  work  these  assets  out  over  time,  thereby  preserving
much of their  value.  The same savings  may result  if the failing  bank is
effectively  taken  over  by the  insurer  in  a financial  assistance  program.
While  cost  minimization  is  important,  it  is  not  the  only  factor  that  should
be  considered  in  handling  failing  banks. In  particular,  there  may  be occasions
when cost  minimization  may conflict  with the objectives  of a DIS to preserve
banking  stability.  For  example,  if  a  nation  has  a  discretionary  coverage  scheme,
the insurer  may feel compelled  to extend  de facto  protection  to uninsured
depositors  in order to avert  contagious  bank runs,  but find that an insured
deposit  payoff  or an insured  deposit  transfer  (which  do not  protect  uninsured
depositors)  would  be  the  lowest  cost  option. In  this  event,  it  is  important  that
the insurer  pursue  the  objective  of preserving  banking  stability,  even if it
means  employing  a  higher  short-run  cost  alternative.
Other  public  interest  factors  also  might  conflict  with  cost  minimization.
One possible  factor  is the convenience  of the  banking  public.  As indicated
earlier,  some failure  resolution  devices  shield  depositors  and  borrowers  from
the disruptions  of a failure  better than others.  Consequently,  since the
function  of  the  banking  system  is  to  serve  the  public,  it  would  seem  reasonable
to allow the insurer  to take public  convenience  into account in resolving
failures. Second,  while  some  failure  resolution  devices  employ  'private  sector
solutions"  that  transfer  the  assets  and  liabilities  of the  failing  bank  to  other
banks,  one device--providing  financial  assistance  to a  failing  bank--usually67
results  in the  insurer  becoming  the  dominant  shareholder  of the  failing  bank.
This  result  places  the  assets  and  liabilities  of the  bank  under  the  control  of
the insurer  (a government  agency)  and over time usually  forces  the insurer,
however  reluctantly,  to  become  involved  in  credit  allocation.  In  some  countries,
this  outcome  would  not  be looked  upon  favorably.  Therefore,  in  these  countries
the insurer  could be authorized  to give weight to seeking private sector
solutions  even  though  such  solutions  sonetimes  might  be  higher  cost  alternatives.
Organizational  Arrangements
In  developing  countries,  there  are  significant  differences  in  the  way  that
deposit  insurance  corporations  are organized  within  the national  government.
In  India,  the  insurance  corporation  is  fully  owned  by the  Central  Bank,  and  the
corporation's  board  comprises  representatives  from the -entral  B.ink  and the
national  government.  In  Colombia,  the  insurer  will  be attached  to the  Central
Bank  during  its  first  few  years in operation. Thereafter,  it will  become  an
independent  agency,  but  will  be  overseen  by the  Superintendency  of  Banks  and  will
have  representatives  from  the  Central  Bank  and the  national  government  on its
board. The  Nigerian  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  is  meant  to  be  an independent
agency,  but is  jointly  owned  by the  Central  Bank  of  Nigeria  and  the  Ministry  of
Finance,  and  has representatives  of both of these  agencies  on its  board. The
Philippines  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  is an independent  agency,  but has
representatives  of the  Central  Bank  and  the  national  government  on its  board.
In  general,  these  DISs  seem  to  fall  into  two  basic  organizational  models,
one where the insurer  is part of the Central  Bank,  and the other  where the
insurer  is an independent  agency  with  managerial  ties  to the  Central  Bank  and
other  governmental  units. There  are  both  pros  and  cons  with  having  the  insurer
lodged  in  the  Central  Bank.  In  many  developing  countries,  the  Central  Bank  is68
the  supervisor  of  banks. In  these cases,  having  the  insurer  in  the  Central  Bank
means  that  all  functions  relating  to  preserving  banking  stability--supervision,
deposit  insurance  and  lender  of last  resort--would  be in the  same  agency. Such
an arrangement  would  promote  consistent  policy  making. It also should  result
in  at least  some  synergies  in  the  use  of  human  resources.
There  are  probably  two  arguments  against  placing  the insurance  function
in  the  Central  Bank. First,  if  the  insurer  also  acts  as the  receiver  for  failed
banks,  as some  do, it would involve  the Central  Bank in considerable  Initty
gritty"  liquidation  activities  that  many would  not regard  as an appropriate
central  banking  .unction. Horeover,  there  is evidence  that  Central  Banks  have
generally  proven  to  be ineffective  at recovery  and  liquidation. 2 0 Second,  if  a
Central  -nk served  as  both the  insurer  and  the  supervisor  of banks,  there  are
occasions  when  the  Central  Bank  might  become  involved  in  at least  the  appearance
of a conflict  of interest. In acting  as an insurer,  the  Central  Bank  might
conclude  that the  best way to handle  a failing  bank situation  is to extend
financial  assistance  to  the  bank. Typically,  when  an  insurer  provides  financial
assistance,  it  acquires  a  controlling  interest  in  the  failing  bank. If  this  were
done  by the  Central  Bank,  however,  the  Central  Bank  would  end  up being  an owner
of the  failing  bank  and that  bank's  supervisor.
In  final  analysis,  there  is  probably  no 'best  way' to  organize  "  deposit
insurance  corporation  in the national  government's  organizational  structure.
All  countries have  their unique characteristics,  and  what  is  the best
organizational  arrangement  for  one country  may  not  be best for  another. What
is important,  however,  is that the  supervisory,  insurance  and lender  of last
resort  functions  be  coordinated  and  operated  harmoniously.  This  objective  could
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be achieved  in a variety  of ways--putting  all functions  in a single  agency,
having  multiple  agencies  with some  overlapping  management,  or having  multiple
agencies  and  establishing  some  form  of interagency  coordinating  committee.
When the insurance  and supervisioT,  functions  are placed in separate
agencies,  there  is a particular  need to coordinate  bank examinations  because
these  examinations  can  be costly. Moreover,  in  most  developing  countries,  bank
examiners,  especially  experienced  ones,  are  in  short  supply. Consequently,  it
is important  to  minimize  any  duplications  by the  insurer  and  the  supervisor  in
the  examination  area.  Probably  the  best  way  to achieve  this  result  is to give
the  supervisor  sole  responsibility  for  conducting  regular  examinations.  At the
conclusio.  of  each  examination,  the  supervisor  would  be required  to  send  a  copy
of the  examination  report  to the  insurer  in  order  to inform  the  insurer  of the
bank's  financial  condition. The  supervisor  also  would  be required  to send  the
insurer  copies of all relevant  financial  reports that banks file with the
supervisor.
While  minimizing  duplication  is  important,  the  insurer  must  be authorized
to  conduct  limited  purpose  examinations  of failing  banks  in  order  to determine
which  failure resolution device would  be  most  appropriate, given  the
circumstances  of each case.  Moreover,  the insurer  should  be authorized  to
conduct  an examination  in those  cases where an insurer  is considering  the
termination  of a bank's  insurance. The insurer  also  should  be able to issue
warnings  to  banks  about  the  possible  termination  of insurance  based  on findings
by  the  supervisor  that  the  bank  has  engaged  in  serious  unsafe  and  unsound  banking
practices  or  serious  violations  of  banking  laws  and  regulations.  Such  warnings
are  like.y  to  be  particularly  effective  because  banks  realize  that  the
termination  of insurance  could  lead  to  the  demise  of the  bank.70
Su..a  n  Conclusi,n
As  indicated  in  this  section,  DISs  are  relatively  complex  mechanisms  and
they  must  be  properly  designed  In  order  to  perform  effectively.  In  general,
these  systems  will  function  best  if:  (i)  the  system  is  public;  (ii)  bank
membership  in  the  system  in  the  system  is  compulsory;  (iii)  deposits  are  not
fully  insured;  (iv)  the  system  is  adequately  funded  and  has  some  form  of
government  back-up  support  in  a  crisis;  and  (v)  the  insurer  can  resolve  failing
bank  situations  in  a  variety  of  ways.ARgendix A
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ARGENT
1.  Unconditional  Government  Guarantee  on Deposits
Origins:  The  government  has  explicitly  backed  deposits  since  1946. The  law  talks
about  the wnationalization*  of deposits,  with  banks  simply  acting  in behalf  of
the  Central  Bank.
Coverage: The  regulations  concerning  the type of banks covered, and the
denomination,  maturity  and  maximum  amount  of deposits  insured  have  varied,  but
the  concept  has remained  ever since. The 1946  law  covered  all  banks,  whether
state owned,  private  or mixed,  and the entire  amount  of demand  and savings
deposits.  After 1957,  only a partial  guarancee  was offered  on accounts  in
private  or mixed banks.  In 1961, the guarantee  was further  restricted  to
domestic  currency  deposits. Over  the  period  1961-73,  coverage  was extended  to
other  private  finascial  institutions  not  previously  insured.  In  1974,  the  limit
of coverage  was  abolished,  and  guarantees  were  extended  to  all  bank liabilities
that  served  to  attract  resources  from  the  public,  whatever  their  nature.
Modalities  of  Operation:  This  guarantee  simply  meant  that  the  Central  Bank  would
pay off depositors  of banks that failed,  but only once its liquidation  was
prescribed  by the Central  Bank itself.  Then the Central  Bank would try to
recover  as much  as possible  from  the  liquidation  of the  failed  bank.  The role
of the  Central  Bank  was extended  in 1977,  when a law  said  that  in addition  the
Central  Bank could  agree  to other  banks taking  over the liabilities  (and  the
ass-'ts)  of  a failed  bank.  But  the  Central  Bank  could  not  mandate  it  or  make  such
an  option  attractive.  Thus,  in  effect,  it  did  not  provide  the  Central  Bank  with
any  additional  tools  with  which  to  handle  failing  or failed  banks.
Financing:  Entirely  from the Central  Bank,  as required. A National  Deposit
Guarantee  Fund  was in  fact  established  in  1971,  but it  was still  entirely  under
the  Central  Bank. There  was  no functional  change  with  the  creation  of the  fund.
2. Deposit  Insurance
Origins:  The  system  existing  up  to  1979  was  an  unconditional  government  guarantee
of  deposits.  After  1979  this  became  formal  deposit  insurance  to  the  extent  that
banks  had  to  make  contributions  to  pay  for  the  scheme. In return  for  having  to
pay  for  it,  membership  was  made  voluntary.
Creation:  August  1979.
Membership:  Voluntary,  for banks and other financial  institutions  offering
depository  services.  Initially,  the  Central  Bank  would  automatically  approve
applications  of  existing  banks.  After  a  certain  deadline,  applications  would
have  to  be screened  by the  Central  Bank.  Also,  member  banks  can  withdraw  from
the  insurance  scheme  at  will.Appendix  A
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Administration:  Entirely  by the  Central  Bank.  The fund is just an account  at
the  Central  Bank,  and  no institution  or  Board  is set  up to look  after  the  fund.
Coverage: Demand,  savings  and term deposits  are covered.  The law seemed  to
exclude  Certificates  of  Deposit,  but  this  was  challenged  in  court,  and  currently
CDs of failing  banks  are  being  assumed  by the  Central  Bank.  Foreign  currency
denominated  accounts,  accounts  of insiders,  and the accounts  of public  sector
institutions  are  excluded. Interbank  deposits  are similarly  excluded,  except
those  maintained  to satisfy  liquidity  requirements. Coverage  was  initially
limited  to  the  first  1  million  pesos,  but  this  was  quickly  raised  to  100  million
in  a  retroactive  fashion  so that  it  has  been  in  effect  from  the  beginning. This
limit  is indexed  to inflation,  and revised  monthly.  It was brought  down to
A81,000 by July 1988.  Deposits  under this limit are reimbursed  in their
entirety,  but  deposits  over this  limit  are  reimbursed  only  by 90%  of the total
amount  of  the  deposit.  Also,  demand  deposits  are  treated  separately  from  savings
and term  deposits  for  the  purposes  of applying  this  minimum  insurance.
Borrowing  authority: Borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank is  a moot issue  as it is
an integral  part  of the  Central  Bank.  Since  Central  Bank  contributions  are  not
mandated,  it  is  not  clear  when  Central  Bank  funds  are  treated  as  an advance  and
when  as  a contribution.  The  law  establishes  that  advances  should  pay  an annual
interest  rate  of 6%  plus inflation  adjustment.
Functions:  As at the  end  of  the  previous  system,  the  Central  Bank  can  only  agree
to  have  other  banks  take  over  a failed  bank  or pay  off  depositors  in the  evnit
of liquidation.  In  the  former  case,  the  bank  is intervened  by the  Central  Bar.Ž-.
Management  is replaced,  the Central  Bank provides  support  with credit  or by
taking  over  assets  of the  failed  bank,  and  then  the  bank is  sold.
Financing:  Banks  have  to pay  a fee  to the  Central  Bank.  This is  calculated  as
0.03% per month of average  monthly deposits.  These assessments,  plus some
Central Bank contributions  which it can make at its own discretion,  are
maintained  in  a fund. Interestingly,  banks  who  over  the  year  are  in compliance
with the  various  ratios  and  regulations  established  by the Central  Bank get a
rebate  of 10%  of their  yearly  contribution.  Standards  that  banks  have to  meet
in order  to get the  rebate  include  minimum  liquidity,  maintenance  of positive
balance  in their  account  with the Central  Bank,  a minimum  ratio  of financial
liabilities  to  capital,  a  maximum  ratio  of  bad  assets,  and  prompt  payment  to  the
deposit insurance  fund.  Therefore,  this assessment  mechanism  amounts to a
variable  interest  rate  premium  that  depends  on the  perceived  riskiness  of the
institution  as proxied  by the bank's compliance  with prudential  and other
regulations.
Supervision  and  enforcement:  The Central  Bank,  as sole  agency  responsible  for
banks,  has  a  wide  range  of  powers. It  can  revoke  the  insurance  (or  license)  of
banks.  Supervision  has  been  mostly  limited  to checking  on the  compliance  with
regulations  rather  tnan  on  prudential  operation  of  banks.
Interesting  features:  No  independent  body  to  regulate  deposit  insurance;  partial
coverage  of deposits  over a specified  minimum,  coverage  being  a proportion  of
total  deposits;  voluntary  membership.ARendjiLx
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Use  of  the  facility:  As of  August  1987,  there  were  20 institutions  under  Central
Bank intervention  and  180 in liquidation. Most liquidations  are  not mandated
by the  Central  Bank,  and  don't  involve  a liability  to  the  Central  Bank  as  insurer
of depositors.  Most troubled  banks  are in fact  intervened.  The  actual  use of
the  insurance  facility is very difficult to establish  because one  can't
disentangle  the  Central  Bank's  interventions  as insurer  from  its  interventions
as  monetary  and institutional  regulator.
Third  generation  deposit  insurance:  The  Central  Bank  does  not  currently  have a
clear  mechanism  for  rehabilitating  banks. There  is  a  proposal,  supported  by the
World  Bank,  to establish  an autonomous  deposit  insurance  corporation  along  the
lines  of the  Spanish  model. A draft  law  already  exists.
SOURCES:
Tabares-Cardona,  German, El  Seguro  de  Deposito y  Fondo  de  Garantias:
Documentacion  Basica,  Superintendencia  Bancaria,  Republica  de Colombia,  1984.
Regimen  Legal de Bancos,  Ch. 7: "Garantia  de los Depositos",  Argentina,  in
Tabares-Cardona  (op.  cit.)
Text of Law 22.051  of August 1979 and of Central  Bank Circular  OPASI-1 that
establish  the conditions  and requirements  for the insurance  of deposits  in
Argentina.
President's  Report  on the banking  Sector  Loan to Argentina,  The World Bank,
February  1988.
Lasi, Juan, El Seauro sobre los Depositos  Bancarios  X  Posibilidades  de su
anlicacion  en Venezuela,  Banco  Central  de  Venezuela,  1961.
McCarthy,  Ian, 'Deposit  Insurance:  Theory  and Practice",  IMF Central  Banking
Service,  January  1980.A2andix  A
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BRAZIL  (a  2ro2osal)
Origins:  The  new  Brazilian  constitution  has  authorized  the  creation  of  a  deposit
insurance  system.
Creation: Expected  in  1989. Many  operational  aspects  have  not  been  worked  out
yet.
Administration: It is a private  system,  both administered  and funded  by the
member  institutions. In fact,  the government  is expressly  forbidden  by the
Constitution  from  contributing  to  the  fund. However,  the  Central  Bank  is  taking
a leading  role  to  set  it  up and  to  establish  its  role  and  structure. The  Board
of  Directors  is elected  by the  member  institutions.
Function: Strictly  to  pay off  depositors  of failed  banks.
Membership:  Compulsory  for universal banks, voluntary for other financial
institutions  like  commercial  banks,  investment  banks,  consumer  finance  companies,
and maybe even leasing companies.  It is not clear whether only private
institutions  will  become  members.
Coverage:  Coverage would be extended to demand deposits, time deposits,
certificates  of  deposits  and  bills  of  exchange.  Passbook  savings  accounts  (which
are covered  by another  insurance  scheme)  and interbank  deposits  would not be
insured  undex  this  system.  The  original  idea  was  to  limit  insurance  to 3,500  OTN
(worth  US$16,500  in December  1988  at the  parallel  market  rate).  However,  OTNs
have  since  been  eliminated,  and it is  not  clear  how insurance  ceilings  will  be
set.  It was expected that this ceiling would protect 75% of  individual
depositors,  but less than  50%  of total  deposits.
Financing:  In June  1988, the Central Bank tentatively  set  the  initial
capitalization  of the  system  at $CZ  65  billion,  but is  considering  raising  it.
This  would  be paid in by member  banks  over time.  The yearly  contributions  by
member  banks  would  be initially  set  by  the  Central  Bank,  but  afte:  a  given  period
it  would  be set  by the  banks  themselves. The  base  for  the  assessment  would  be
total  insured  liabilities.
Enforcement  powers:  The Board would have the power to deny entry to any
institution  that  is deemed  to  be an  unacceptable  risk,  and  to revoke  insurance
of a  member  bank  who is deemed  to  be unsafe  and  unsound.
SOURCES:
Talley,  Samuel,  wAppraisal  of  Prudential  Regulation  Relating  to  Brazil:  FSAL  I",
The  World  Bank,  December  1988.Ag2endix  A
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CHILE
1. Interim  Government  Guarantee  on  Deposits
Origins:  In the mid-1970s,  the Chilean  banking system was very adversely
affected  by two  factors:  a deep  recession  caused  by the  rise in  oil prices  and
the  drop in copper  prices,  and  a rapid  liberalization  of the financial  sector
which sought to reduce the state monopolization  and control of financial
institutions.  After  the  collapse of  several small non-bank financial
institutions,  an important  bank  threatened  to  fail  towards  the  end  of 1976. The
government tried to defuse the situation  by  assuming all  of  the banks'
liabilities  even  though  they  were  not explicitly  ensured. Because  there  were
clear indications  that a  spate of failures  would follow, the government
immediately  instituted  an  interim deposit insurance scheme to handle the
situation.
Creation:  January  1977.
Administration:  There was no body as such responsible  for managing the
guarantees.  It  became  the  Superintendency  of  Banks  and  Financial  Institutions's
(SBFI)  role,  as regulator  and  supervisor  of  banks,  to  take  measures  which  would
result  in the honoring  of such guarantees. The SBFI was an entity  legally
independent  of the Central  Bank,  and  was therefore  responsible  for approving
demands  upon the scheme  and appointing  liquidators. But because it did not
provide  the  financing,  it  was  not formally  the  party  insuring  deposits.
Financing: By the  Treasury,  directly  from  the  Budget. There  is  no premium  on
either  banks  or depositors.
Membership:  All  banks  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  are  covered.  (Since
there are no bank assessments,  it becomes irrelevant  whether the scheme is
compulsory  or voluntary.)
Coverage:  Maximum  coverage  was set  at 100 tax  units.  A tax  unit was a CPI-
indexed  unit  of  account  equal  to  about  176  pesos  then,  or  about  US$10. Deposits
are  covered  on the  basis  of the  principal,  index  adjustments  and interest.
Functions:  The deposit  guarantee  scheme  became  one  more obligation,  as well  as
one  more  tool,  for  the  SBFI. When  a  problem  bank  emerged,  the  SBFI  could  approve
applications  for  payouts  and  appoint  liquidators.  Also,  when  the  SBFI  intervened
in a bank, shareholders  were forced  to lose their  equity in order to cover
losses.
Supervisory  and  enforcement  powers: The  control  over  deposit  insurance  was  held
in  effect  by  the  same  body  that  was  responsible  for  supervision  of  banks.  The
SBFI  was  charged  with  auditing  most  intermediaries  and  establishing  accounting
standards.  It  had  the  power  to  request  any  necessary  information  from  banks,
and  could  impose  fines  or  replace  the  management  of  banks.
Use  of  the  facility:  Since  the  beginning,  the  government  actually  repaid  mostftRendill  A
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of the  deposits  held at failing  banks,  even if  over the  specified  limit.  Four
commercial  banks,  accounting  for  35%  of the  system's  assets,  were intervened  by
the Central  Bank in November  1981  and eventually  liquidated. All depositors
managed  to  recover  their  funds.  The  actual  use  of  the  insurance  facility  is  very
difficult  to establish  because  one can't  disentangle  the  SBFI's  interventions
as insurer  from  its  interventions  as regulator  of banks.
2.  Comglementarv  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme
Origins:  The  system  set  up in 1977  was  an interim  measure.  It  was created  to
meet  a short-term  crisis,  pending  a more  complete  study  of the  requirements  of
a  formal  system. The  bank  failures  in  November  1981  created  a  new  cLisis,  which
was  met  by the  expansion  of the  deposit  insurance  scheme.
Creation:  December  1981.
Nature  of the  scheme: The  previous  deposit  insurance  guarantee  was  preserved,
but a complementary  insurance  scheme  was set up.  Depositors  could purchase
additional  coverage  from the government. It was a formal  deposit insurance
scheme to  the  extent that depositors,  through the banks, had  to  make
contributions  to  pay for  it.
Administration:  As before,  the  SBFI  had the  authority  to call  on the fund  to
meet the  insurance  requirements,  but it  did  not  have ownership  over  the  fund.
Functions: The  role  of the  SBFI  remained  unchanged. However,  the  liability  of
the  authorities  was  greater  to  the  extent  that  depositors  acquired  the  additional
protection.
Modality  of  operation:  The  SBFI's  powers  were  expanded,  allowing  it  to  intervene
more  directly  in  a  problem  bank. The  SBFI  could  intervene  in  a bank  to replace
its  management  and  write  down  shareholder's  capital.  The  SBFI  could  then  decide
on whether  the  bank  was to  be liquidated  or not.  In the  event  of liquidation,
the  receiver  would  proceed  to  transfer  part  of the  assets  and  liabilities  to  an
acquiring  bank.  In either  case,  depositors  who had not been able to recover
their  deposits  would  be paid  off.  After  1982,  a now  modality  for  interventior.
was introduced:  the  purchase  of the  risky  portfolios  by the  Central  Bank.  The
non-performing  portfolio  was replaced,  in  an amount  up to 100% of capital  and
reserves,  with essentially  long-term  debt of the Central Bank.  While the
obligation  to repurchase  was  still outstanding,  the financial institution
concerned was required to devote 100% of its surpluses to such  repurchase.
Hembership:  Voluntary  for  depositors  of  banks  and  non-bank  financial  institutions
that  come  under  the  control  of the  SBFI. Note that  it  was the  depositors,  not
the  bank,  who decided  on the acquisition  of the  extra insurance. Banks  were
required to make this insurance available to its depositors.
Coverage:  The previous  universal  guarantee  covered  a maximu  100 tax units.
Under the  new complementary  deposit  insurance  schome,  depositors  could  opt toAogendix A
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cover,  on  top  of th's  universal  coverage,  up to 75  percent  of their  deposits  or
150 tax units,  whichever  was less.  Total maximal  coverage  therefore  became
US$5,061  equivalent  in September  1982.  Demand,  savings  and  term deposits  can
be insured. All  such  accounts  belonging  to  one  individual  are  consolidated  for
the purposes  of this minimum.  Coverage  is limited to principal  and index
adjustments,  and  excludes  non-capitalized  interest. Interbank  deposits  cannot
be insured.
Financing:  A fund is maintained  at the  Central  Bank.  The funds  can only be
invested  in government  or government  guaranteed  securities. The  DIF collects
monthly  fees  amounting  to 0.1%  of  average  insured  monthly  deposits  from  member
banks.  Banks pass on this fee to the depositors  who have requested the
additional  insurance.  The  law  allows  for  varying  assessmeAt  rates  depenetng  on
type  of deposit,  but in practice  the  same  rate is  applied. Contributions  from
the  government  to the  fund  can  also  be made  directly  from  the  budget,  but these
are  not mandated  in any  way.  The Treasury  remained  responsible  for covering
losses  under  the  original  guarantee  system.
Tax  treatment:  The  fund,  and  the  operations  related  to it,  are  free  from  taxes.
Use of the facility:  Because  the SBFI was seen as de-facto  protecting  all
deposits,  many institutions  actually  chose  not to participate  in the deposit
insurance  scheme. Two rounds  of bank failures  followed. In mid-1982,  three
commercial  banks  were intervened  and  eventually  liquidated,  and  all  depositors
were paid off, even those  not expressly  covered  by the insurance  scheme.  In
January  1983,  the  banking  crisis  hit a  peak  when  7  banks,  accounting  for  45%  of
the  system's  loans,  had  to  be intervened.  Three  of  them  were  quickly  liquidated,
and  the  State  covered  70%  of the  amounts  owed  to domestic  creditors
Death  of the system: The system  of deposit  guarantees  and insurance  da;  not
taken seriously as depositors  and bankers realized that in prac':ice  the
government  would  assume  most  or  all  of  the  banking  losses.  Therefore,  ia  January
1983 the  government  decreed  that it  was going  to guarantee  100% of deposits,
thereby  decreeing  what was already  happening  in practice.  Originally,  this
exceptional  coverage  was in effect  until  the  end of 1983,  but it  was extended
several  times. Only  deposits  of insiders  were not  covered. Payments  against
this guarantee  would be made from the DIF if the deposit  was eligible for
complementary  insurance,  or else  directly  from  the  budget.
3.  Deposit  Insurance.  Round  3
Origin:  The financial  crisis  in Chile  was  very deep.  In all, close  to 75% of
banking capital had  come under  the  control of  the  State  through SBFI
interventions.  This  was  a marked  reversion  from  the  privatization  sweep  in  the
mid-1970s,  when all  but one  bank were privatized. A new Banking  Law in 1986
sought  to  reorient  the  financial  system.
Creation:  January  1987.
Coverage:  Coverage  is  broken  down  into  three  categories.  First,  demand  deposits&AMndix A
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and  time  deposits  of  remaining  maturity  less  than  10  days  (i.e.  liquid  deposits)
at commercial  banks are  covered  in their  entirety. Second,  other  deposits  at
commercial  banks  and  Sociedades  Financleras  are  90%  insured  up to a maximum  of
120  UP per  depositor  in  all  the  flnancial  system.  In other  words,  the  maxLmum
payout  would  be  90%  of  120  UF,  or  about  $1,800.  Banks  could  apply  for  additional
coverage  on a transltiotual  basis  over  the  period  1986-88. Thuw,  under  such  an
arrangement  deposits  outside  of the  above  limLts  would  be 908  covered  after  the
end of 1986,  80%  covered  from  June 1987,  70%  from  end 1987,  and  608 from  June
1988. The  third  guarantee  covers  all  deposits  and  liLbillities  of the  state  Bank
(Banco  del  Estado).
Financing:  Unfunded. The  Central  Bank is  responsible  for  covering  any insured
financial  liabilities  in excess  of assets.
Enforcement  and supervision  powers:  These lie  with the SBFI.  The length  of
decision  periods  is  very  long:  following  the  identification  of  a  problem  by the
SBIF,  the  bank  has 30  days  to  call  a shareholders'  meeting  to recapitalise.  If
this  is  unsuccessful,  there  is  then  a  period  of  about  15  days  to  consider  further
actions.
SOURCES:
Larrain,  Mauricio, 'Treatment  of Banks in Difficulties:  The Case of Chile",
unpublished  manuscript,  The  World  Bank.
Hanna,  Donald,  'The  Chilean  Financial  System,  1974-1983:  The  Regulatory  Role  in
Financial  Collapse",  Ch.  1  in  Heads  I  Win:  Tales  of  the  Chilean  Financial  System,
unpublished  PhD  dissertation,  Harvard  University,  September  1987.
Tabares-Cardona,  German, El  Seguro de  DeOsito  v  Fondo  de  Garantias:
Documentacion  Basica,  Superintendencia  Bancaria,  Republica  de Colombia,  1984.
McCarthy,  Ian, 'Deposlt  Insurance:  Theory  and Practicem,  IMF Central  Banking
Service,  January  1980.
Legislaclon  Bancaria Chilena, Superlntendencla  de  Bancos e  Instituciones
Financieras,  May 1988.
Gelb,  Alan, *Chile:  BTOR  Mission,  May  4-14,  1987",  June 1987.RRDndix  A
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COLOMBU
Financial  Institution  Guarantee  Fund (FIGF)
Creation:  December  1985.
Administration:  The  FIGF  is to  be attached  to the  Central  Bank for  a  period  of
five  years,  with the  Central  Bank  providing  office  space  and  staff  to  the  FIGF.
After  five  years,  it will  become  independent.  However,  its  Board  will retain
representations  from  the  Government  and  the  Central  Bank,  and  will continue  to
be overseen  by the  Superintendency  of Banks.
Functions:  To participate  in the liquidation  of failed  banks and pay off
depositors;  to  restructure  failing/failed  banks  by assuming  temporary  ownership
and  management;  and to  ensure  that  member  banks  have  enough  liquidity.
Modalities  of  operation: When the  Superintendency  of Banks  decides  on a bank
closure,  the  FIGF  can  participate  in  liquidation  proceedings.  If  the
Superintendency  orders  a  bank to recapitalize  and  existing  shareholders  do not
satisfy  the  order,  the  FIGF  is  allowed  to  provide  the  necessary  capital  even if
that  means  purchasing  more  than  50%  of the  bank. The FIGF,  under  the  advice  of
the Superintendency,  normally  mandates  the  write-off  of existing  shareholder
capital. If  the  entire  capital  has  been  lost,  the  FIGF  reduces  the  nom.:nal  price
of  each  share  to  l  cent. In either  case,  the  FIGF  will  assume  temporary  control
in an attempt  to refloat  the  bank.  It can do so by purchasing  assets  or by
granting  credit  or guarantees  to the  intervened  bank.  It is  mandated  to sell
its shares  of the  bank  within  a reasonable  period  of time.  The FIGF  can also  I
provide assistance  in the form of credit or guarantees  to troubled  member
institutions  that  are  not  yet intervened,  but  only  under  a concerted  program  to
turn  the  bank around.
Supervision  and  enforcement  powers:  These  lie  entirely  with the  Superintendency
of Banks.
Membership:  Compulsory  for most classes  of financial  institutions,  including
commercial  finance  companies.
Coverage:  According  to the  law,  the  guarantee  on  deposits  cannot  exceed  75%  of
the  established  limits  (contradiction  in  termsl). In  1988,  a  Col$200,000  limit
was  introduced.  Insiders  who  are  shown  to  be in  any  way  responsible  for  a  bank'  s
failure  will  not  be covered.
Findncing:  The FIGF  can  collect  an initiation  fee  from  new  bank  members. This
was  based  on  each  bank's  reserve  position  and  was  accompanied  by  a corresponding
reduction  in reserve  requirements. Yearly  bank assessments  in the form of
compulsory  purchase  of the FIGF's  o.)ligations  in the amount  of 0.3% of each
bank's  total  deposits  (up  from  0.05%  prior  to  December  1989). These  obligations
are  for  a maturity  of up to 8 years,  at an interest  determined  by the  Central
Bank. The law  envisions  the  reduction  or  elimination  of these  assessments  when
and if the fund reaches  an appropriate  size.  It also envisions  differentialA2gendix A
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assessment  rates  or a system  of  rebates. In all,  bank assessments  are  not to
exceed  0.05%  of a bank's  total  deposits  per  month.  ContributiGns  can also  be
made from  the  budget,  in an  amount  not to exceed  the  total  amount  of fines  and
penalties  collected  by the  Superintendency  of Banks.
Borrowing  capacity:  A bank may  borrow  both from  the  Central  Bank and from the
public  by issuing  securitles.  The  limits,  terms  and  conditions  on  Central  Bank
credit  were  originally  regulated  by the  Central  Bank. As of December,  1989  an
overall  cap  was  placed  on the  government  credit  the  bank  could  draw  upon.
Tax  treatment:  Tax  exempt.
Use  of  the  facility:  In  practice  there  is  an  unlimited  blanket  deposit  guarantee,
with the FIGF covering insured institutions  and the Central Bank covering
uninsured institutioais. The FIGF is currently intervening  in five banks
(including  the  largest  one)  in  an  attempt  to  turn  them  around  and  eventually  re-
sell  them,  and  is  in  the  process  of  liquidating  another  bank. On  the  other  hand,
three  non-insured  institutions  have  been  supported  with  Central  Bank credit.
SOURCES:
Text  of:  Law  117  of 1985,  Decree  32 of 1986,  and  Decree  59 of 1986.
Consultant's  report  on Colombia  for the  wCross  Country  Comparison  of Financial
Systems'  in  Latin  America,  1988.A22endix  A
Page  11
CUBA  (a  curio)
Deiosit  Insurance  Fund
Origin: It  was  created  in  direct  response  of the  establishment  of the  FDIC in
the  United  States.  The idea  was to avoid the flight  of capital  towards  the
insured  banking market  in the US, and to favor indigenous  Cuban Danks over
American  banks.
Creation:  September  1952 - the  second  in the  worldl
Administration:  The  Board  is  composed  of  representatives  from  the  Central  Bank,
Ministry  of Finance,  and the Association  of Banks.  Therefore,  through the
Association,  private  banks  have representation  in the  Board  of the  DIF.
Membership:  Compulsory  for  all  national  banks.
Coverage:  Deposits  up to 10,000  pesos.
Functions: The DIP  only acts  in the  event  of the  failure  of a bank,  in order
to  assist  in its  liquidation.
Modality  of operations: When the  Central  Bank  decides  to close  the  bank, the
DIF's  role  is to  pay  off  depositors  up to the  prescribed  amount,  participate  in
liquidation  procedures to help other creditors recover their funds, and,
interestingly,  compensate  the  bank staff  who  are laid  off in  proportion  to the
years  of service  in  the  bank  but in an  amount  not to  exceed  one  year's  salary.
Financing:  The  fund  was  designed  to  maintain  a capital  of 10  million  pesos. To
reach  this  amount,  the  Central  Bank  contributed  1  million  pesos  yearly  and  the
private  banks  contributed  100,000  pesos  yearly  (distributed  according  to their
share  in  total  deposits)  for  a  number  of years  until  the  sum  had  been  reached.
There  were  no  iregular  bank  assessments.  When  capital  dipped  below  the  10  million
pesos  benchmark,  the  DIF could  replenish  its  capital  by mandating  the  Central
Bank  and  private  banks  to  purchase  obligations  from  the  DIF. Indeed,  as  o!  end-
June  1959,  the  size  of the  fund  was  9,691,768  pesos.  The fund is invested  in
bonds  of the  government  or the  development  banks.
Borrowing  authority:  No limit  is specified  on borrowing  from  the Central  Bank
in  case  of tempcrary  shortfall  of funds.
Supervisory  and  enforcement  powers: These  lie  entirely  with the  Central  Bank.
The DIF  cannot  withdraw  the  insurance  of any  bank.
Use of the facility:  It has been used to liquidate  banks,  but no precise
information  is  available.  Also,  it is  not  clear  what  happened  to the  DIF  after
the  Cuban  revolution  in 1958.
Interesting  features: Date of its  creation;  paying  off  bank employees  as well
as  bank depositors;  maintaining  a constant  fund.ARRendix  A
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SOURCE:
Lasi, Juan, El Seguro sobre log Degositos  Bancarios  v  Posibilidades  de su
aslicAcion  en  Venezuela,  Banco  Central  de  Venezuela,  1961.Appendix A
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Deposit  Insurance  CoroorationL  (DIC
Creation:  DIC  was  establir.hed  in  January  1962,  in  the  wake  of two  bank  failures
in the previous  year.  !a  1978, it was merged  with the Credit Guaranitee
Corporation  of India  (credit  guarr--tee  operations  not discussed  here).
Administration:  It is  fully  owned  by the  Reserve  Bank.  Its  Board  of Directors
comprises  representatives  from  the  Reserve  Bank  and  the  central  government.  The
Reserve  Bank  provides  the  staff  and  office  space  for the  DIC, for  which  it  is
reimbursed. Almost  all decisions  involving  the DIC are taken  by the  Reserve
Bank,  so that  the  DIC  is de facto  not independent.
Coverage: It originally  covered  commercial  banks.  This was extended  in 1968
to  cooperative  banks  with  a  minimum  size  operating  in  States  having  the  pertinent
legislation,  and  in  1975  to  rural  banks  All  deposits  are  covered,  except  those
of foreign  governments,  Central  and State governments,  or other  banks.  The
maximum  insured  deposit  was initially  fixed  at Rs 1,500.  This  was raised  to
5,000 in 1968, to 10,000 in 1970, to 20,000 in 1976, and finally to 30,000 in
1980. In  1970,  63%  of  all  member  batk  deposits  were  in  fact  insured  (i.e.  under
the  limit). This  percentage  has risen  to about  75%  in the  1980s.
Financing: The  Reserve  Bank subscribes  the  entire  paid-up  capital,  which is
invested  entirely  in government  bonds. It  started  with a  paid-up  capital  of Rs
10  million,  was increased  over  the  early  1970s  (1972  and  1975)  to  Rs 50  million,
and  with the  merger  with the  CGC  was raised  to Rs 100  million. DIC also  gets
funding  from  bank assessments  based  on wassessable  deposits',  i.e.,  those  not
excluded  as listed  above. Assessable  deposits  account  for  around  95%  of total
deposits. The  premium  was  originally  set  at 0.05%  per  annum,  but  was decreased
to  0.04%  in 1971. The  Act specifies  a limit  of 0.15%  for  premia. The  premium
was  collected  quarterly  up to 1979,  and  then  was  collected  semi-annually.
Membership:  Compulsory.
Funds  maintain* by the  DIC:  It  has  three  funds:  the  General  Fund  which  holds
the initial  cal  tal.  The interest  on this Fund is used to pay the operating
expenses  of the  D.C.  The  size  of this  fund  in  relation  to  deposits  has  remained
quite  constant  since  tt.e  late 1960s.  The Fund accounts  roughly  for 0.5% of
insured  deposits,  or 0.35%  of assessable  deposits. The  Deposit  Insurance  Fund,
which feeds  on premium income  and its  own investment  income,  is used to pay
claims  of  depositors.  A temporary  transfer  from  the  General  Fund  to  the  DIF  can
be made to  meet liabilities.  And,  after  1978,  tnae  Credit  Guarantee  Fund. The
Fund  had  Rs 513  million  in 1976,  i.e.,  0.46%  of insured  deposits.
Borrowing  capacity: The DIC  can request  to  borrow  up to Rs 50  million  at any
one  time  from the  Reserve  Jank.  The  Reserve  Bank  must decide  on the  request,
and sets  the  terms  and  conditions  of the  advance.
Modalities  of Operation: Problem  banks  under  the X1C  could  be (i)  liquidated,ApRendix  A
Page 14
(ii) merged  (wamalgamated^)  into healthy banks,  or  (iii)  restructured
("reconstructed")  so as to return  them  to solvency. The DIC's  function  is to
pay off depositors  in the event of liquidatioi-,  or to pay depositors  whose
liability  is  not  assumed  by the  new  or merging  bank.
Supervision  and  enforcement: It is the  Central  Bank's,  not the  DIC's,  role  to
supervise  banks.  It is also the Central  Banks' responsibility  to withdraw
insurance  of non-compliant  banks,  to declare  a bank insolvent  and to throw  it
into  the  DIC's  auspices,  ^r to  decide  on the  course  of  action  on  a troubled  bank.
Tax  treatment:  The  DIC  was  originally  tax  exempt,  but  this  was  withdrawn  in  1985.
Use  of the facility: Since  its  creation  arid  up to 1987,  17  commercial  banks,
mostly  small,  have come under the DIC.  However,  at the same time over 250
commercial  banks have closed  c,wn or merged.  Apparently  these banks,  when
liqvidated,  had  enough  funds  to  pay  off  depositors,  or,  when  merged,  had  positive
equiLy  to  make them  marketable.  This  trend  clearly  shows  a  consolidation  of the
banking  sector  into  bigger  and  more  solid  institutions.  Of these  17  banks,  14
occurred  prior  to 1970,  one in 1986,  and  2 in 1987. Host of these  resulted  in
a  merger,  but  two  of them  were  restructured  and  one  was  liquidated.  Cooperative
bank failares  have  recently  been  more  common,  but they  are  so small  as to  have
a  negligible  effect. Since  1976,  17 cooperative  banks  have  come  under  the  DIC.
In all, only  a small  portion  of its  capital  has  been paid out.  As of the  end
1976,  only Rs 11.3  million  were  paid out (less  than  one-fifth  of the  premiums
in 1976  alone).
Deposit  insurance  in  State-owned  banking: The Indian  banking  system  is  almost
entirely  state-owned,  with private  banks  only  accounting  for not  more than 5%
of total  deposits. Government  deposit  ins -ance  of State-owned  institutions  is
in  a sense  redundant,  as the  government  is insuring  itself. This  explains  why
the  DIC  hasn't  had  much  of  a role:  there  are  many  other  channels  for  supporting
the  banks.  Thus,  it becomes  apparent  that  the  DIC  has not really  been put to
a test  yet.
Relationship  w''h the  CGC: The  credit  guarantee  scheme  is  very expensive,  and
it is likely  that the  deposit  insurance  part serves  to subsidize  the credit
guarantee  part.  Officially,  these  are  kept separate  by having  separate  funds.
SOURCES:
McCarthy,  Ian, JDeposit  Insurance:  Theory  and Practice',  IMF Central  Banking
Service,  January  1980.
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  and  Deposit  Insurance  and  Credit  Guarantee
Corporation,  Annual  Report,  various  years  1962-85.
Tho  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Act  No.  67  of  1961,  as  amended  up  to  August
1970.nRendix  A
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Degosit  Protection  Fund  Board  (DPFB)
Origins  and  creation:  It  was  created  in  1985  in  the  wake  of four  bank failures.
Administration:  The  Board  is  chaired  by the  governor  of the  Central  Bank. The
Treasury  is  represented  on  the  Board  through  its  permanent  secretary.  Staff  and
office  space  are  provided  for  by the  Central  Bank --  and it is not reimbursed
for  it.
Membership:  Compulsory  for  all  licensed  banks  and  financial  institutions  (e.g.
building  societies)  that  accept  deposits  and issue  loans.
Function: Paying  off  depositors  in the  event  that  a  bank  doesn't  meet  all its
obligations. Also,  may on its  own accord  preemptively  act to reduce  risk of
insolvency  of banks,  although  it  has a  very limited  capability  at present.
Modality  of operation:  (:)  When a depositor  does  not see his claim  on a bank
satisfied,  he can  ask  the  DPFB  to  pay  him  off. Any  investigations  or  assessment
of the  bank's  situation  is  then  undertaken  by the  Centra Bank  under  a request
from the DPFB.  It is not the DPFB's role to liquidate  the bank, but will
participate  in  court  or o-her  bankruptcy  procedures  in order  to try  to recover
its  liabilities.  (2)  In order  to bolster  the position  of a troubled  bank and
reduce  its  risk,  the  DPFB  may lend  to,  place  a  deposit  with,  issue  a guarantee,
or purchase  the  assets  of a licensed  bank.
Supervision  and  enforcement  powers: Bank  supervision  is  undertaken  entirely  by
the  Central  Bank.  The  DPFB can  punish  imprudent  banks  or  banks  that  are  not
being  managed  in  the  best  interest  of  its  depositors  by  increasing  that  bank's
assessment  beyond  the  maximum  0.4%  or  by  revoking  the  insurance  of its  deposits.
Coverage:  Insurance  by the DPFB covers  the excess  of an individual's  total
deposits  (or  other  bank  liabilities)  in  a  particular  bank  minus  any  of  the  bank'  s
assets  that  the  individual  may  hold. Maximum  insurance  coverage  is  Kshs  100,000.
Individuals  who  are  deemed  to  be responsible  for  the  insolvency  of the  bank are
not  covered  by the  insurance.
Financing:  For 1986 and 1987, bank assessments  amounted to 0.1% of the
arithmetic  average  of twelve  months  deposit  balances. There  is  a minimum  Kshs
100,000  contribution  for  every  bank.  Bank  assessments  are  not to exceed  0.4%.
Fund  operated  by DPFB:  Kshs  87.164  -'llion  as of end-1986. The entire  amount
is  required  to  be invested  ixs  goverrnent  bonds  of  maturity  not  more  than  91  days.
Investment  income  is  reinvested  in  the  fund. Operating  expenses  are  covered  by
the  fund.
Borrowing  authority:  There  is  no specified  limit  to  borrowing  from  the  Central
Bank,  but any advance  has to be authorized  by the Minister  of Finance.  Any
borrowing  should  be strictly  to temporarily  make  up any  deficienicy  in  the  fund,AuRendixA
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pending  collection  of contributions.
Use of the  facility: The fund  had not, as of January  1988,  yet paid out  any
funds.
SOURCE:
Deposit  Protection  Fund  Board,  Balance  Sheet  as at 31st  December  1987.
Text of the  Banking (Amendment)  Act No. 17 cf 1985,  and the Banking (Deposit
Protection  Fund)  Regulations  of 1986.App)endix  A
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NIGERIA
Nigerian  DeRosit  Insurance  Corporation  (NDIC)
Origin: The  Nigerian  banking  sector  has  not  experienced  any  bank  failure  in the
last thiee  decades. This is more due to the fact that the  predominant  State
governments  have  been supporting  the  state-owned  banks in  what amounts  to de-
facto  deposit  insurance. However,  a recent  survey  of the  banking sector  has
revealed  that  a significant  number  of banks  would  be technically  insolvent  if
provisioning  rules  were enforced. The  NDIC  was created  with the  intention  of
improving  the  credibility  of the  financial  sector  as a whole.
Creation:  The  NDIC  was  created  in  June  1988  and  assessments  have  been  collected
on the  basis  of banks'  deposits  in 1988,  but explicit  deposit  insurance  will
start  in  June 1989.
Administration:  The  NDIC  has started  as an offshoot  of the  Central  Bank,  from
which  it is  initially  drawing  its  staff  and  office  space. However,  it is  meant
to be an independent  body.  It is jointly  owned  by the  Central  Bank and the
Ministry  of Finance,  and  both are represented  in the Board  of the  NDIC.  The
executive  directors  are  appointed  by the  President.
Membership:  Compulsory  of all  commercial  and  merchant  banks.
Coverage: All deposits,  except  those  of insiders  or those  held as collateral
for  a loan  and  excluding  certificates  of  deposits,  up to a  maximum  of  N 50,000.
Interestingly,  the minimum size of a deposit at a merchant  bank (entirely
commercial  deposits)  is  N 50,000,  so that  in  the  event  of  failure  of a  merchant
bank,  the  NDIC  would  not  ba at all liable.
Financing: The  NDIC  was originally  set  up with  an authorized  capital  of N 100
million. This capital  is to  be subscribed  60%  by the  Central  Bank  and 40%  by
the Federal  Government. However,  only N 50 million is paid up capital.  It
assesses  member  banks  at the  rate  of  15/16ths  of 1%  of  deposits  on the  previous
year.
Operation  of  the  fund: A fund  is  to  be maintained.  The  net  operational  surplus
of  the  corporation  is  to  be reinvested  in  the  fund,  unless  the  fund  is  more  than
ten times  larger  than the  paid-in  capital. In this  latter  case,  a quarter  of
the  net  operational  surplus  is to  be returned  to shareholders  as dividends.
Borrowing  authority: No limit  is  specified  on  borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank.
It is not stated  whether  tho  Central  Bank  needs  to authorized  the advance,  or
who decides  on the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  advance.
Function: It  has the  double  function  of paying  off  depositors  in the  event  of
a bank failure  and giving  assistance  in case of imminent  or actual  finar.cial
difficulties  to  banks  when suspension  of payments  is  threatened.ftgendix A
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Modalities  of  Operations: When the  NDIC observes  that  a  bank's  operations  are
such  as to  warrant  its  closure,  it  must give 30 day  notice  to the  bank  before
it  can  withdraw  its  insurance.  It is then  the  Minister  of Finance  who  appoints
the  NDIC  as the  receiver  of the  bank.  The  bank  can  then  be readmitted  into  the
insurance  scheme  if it successfully  cleans  up its  finances  and  operations. To
this  end, the  NDIC  may  assist  failing  banks  by granting  loans  on terms  decided
upon by the NDIC or offer  guarantees. In addition,  the NDIC is empowered  to
temporarily  take over the management  of the bank, direct changes in the
management  and operation  of the  bank,  or arrange  a merger.  In the  case of a
merger, the NDIC can assume the difference  between the transferred  deposit
liabilities  and wacceptable'  assets  (i.e.,  bad assets  can  be carved  out).  In
order  to liquidate  a  bank,  the  Minister  of Finance  must give  its  approval,  and
a receiver  will be appointed. Then the  NDIC will pay off all depositors  not
satisfied  in the  liquidation  proceedings.
Decision-making  powers:  The NDIC can only assume  the management  of a failing
bank,  merge  it,  or act to  close  it  with the  consent  of the  Ministry  of Finance
(this  policy  is  under  review). However,  the  NDIC  can itself  manage  a  bank  once
it is  declared  its  receiver.
Supervisory  and  enforcement  powers: The  NDIC  can  issue  cease  and  desist  orders
to  member  banks,  and,  when  these  are  not  satisfied,  revoke  the  insurance  on  such
a  bank.  Supervisory  duties  and information  are  to be shared  between  the  NDIC
and the  Central  Bank,  but specifics  haven't  yet  been  worked  out.  The NDIC is
empowered  to request  any information  from  member  banks.
Tax treatment:  The NDIC is a  taxable entity.  On the other hand, bank
assessments  are tax  deductible.
Use  of the facility: As explicit  insurance  has  not  yet  begun,  the  NDIC  has as
yet  not  been  used. It  appears  that  the  NDIC  is  shying  away  from  intervening  very
strongly  at first,  with the intention  of not rocking  the  system. It appears,
therefore,  that  its  efforts  will initially  be geared  more  towards  strengthening
member  banks  rather  than  towards  restructuring  or liquidating  them.
SOURCES:
Nigerian  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Decree  No. 22 of 1988.
Information  collected  by September  1988  and  January  1989  World  Bank  missions  to
Nigeria.
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  wConclusions  and  Recommendations  of the
FDIC  Assessment  Mission  to the  NDICW,  July 1988.AogendixA
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rMAGuAY
Sistema  Nacional  de  Ahorro  Y Fresta%2  para  la  Vivienda
Origins:  Modelled  after the Federal  Home Loan Bank system  in the U.S., the
Sistema  is a  network  of Sociedades  de Ahorro  y Prestamo  para la  Vivienda  which
operate  under  the  backing  and  control  of an umbrella  Bank (in  turn  called  the
Banc,  Nacional  de  Ahorro  y  Prestamo  para  la  Vivienda).  USAID  initially  provided
$2  millioa  in  capital,  and  subsequent  financing  was  received  from  USAID  and  IDB.
The  Sistema  is  designed  to  cover  a small  niche  in  Paraguay's  financial  system  -
- to  provide  mortgage  finance. The  Sistema  holds  around  14%  of total  deposits
in the  country.
Creation:  December  1971.
Membership:  Open  only  to  members  of the  Sistema. There  were  6  member  Sociedades
up to  April  1988.
Administration:  It is run  by the  Banco  Nacional,  which acts  as a Central  Bank
for  member  institutions.
Coverage:  All deposits at member institutions.  The maximum coverage  per
depositor  was  initially  set  at  G2  million,  and  subsequently  raised  to  G5  million.
Financing: Annual  premium  of 0.25%  of total  monthly  average  deposits  at each
institution.  This is  paid  monthly.
Central  Bank support:  The Central  Bank  ultimately  has responsibility  for the
Banco  Nacional,  and  so it is  behind  the  deposit  insurance.
Functions:  The objective  of the  scheme  is to provide  cheap  financing  for  home
building. Deposit  insurance  is  granted  as  a  way  to  increase  the  competitiveness
of these  institutions  relative  to other  banks  and  non-banks,  thereby  reducing
their  cost  of funds. This  as-hme  is  supplemented  by a  credit  guarantee  scheme.
Modality  of operations;  In  the  event  of a  temporary  liquidity  crisis,  the  Banco
Nacional  can,  within  24  hours,  grant  assistance  to  member  institutions.  If the
problem  is deemed  to be permanent,  the Banco  Nacional  can ir.tervene  in the
Sociedad  and  assume  its  control. Within  30  days it  must  pay  off  depositors  and
transfer  the assets and liabilities  (up to the insured  amounc) to another
Sociedad. The Banco  Nacional  will pay the  acquiring  Sociedad  an amount  equal
to  the  shortfall  in  assets  over  liabilities.  Prior  to  the  Sociedades  approaching
the  Banco  Nacional  for assistan.e.,  they  may  require  depositors  to submit  a 30
day  notice  prior  to their  withdrawal  of funds.
Supervisory  and  enforcement  powers:  The  BAnco  Nacional  has  exclusive
responsibility  over  member  institutions,  and  so  with  it  lies  all  supervisory
functions. The  Banco  Nacional  is itself  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Central
Bank,  but  the  Central  Bank  does  not  supervise  and  regulate  each  Sociedad.ARRendix  A
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Use  of  the  facility:  One  year  after  operation  of  the  Sintema,  one  institution
failed. Because  of the  as yet  precarious  financial  sLtuation  of the  Banco
Nacional,  the  Central  Bank  covered  the  losses.
SOURCES:
Law  No.  325  of  December  1971  and  Decree  No.  29721  of  December  1972  that  establish
and  regulate  Che  Sistema  Nacional  de  Ahorro  y  Prestamo  para  la  Vivienda;  Law  No.
1378  of  December  1988  modifying  Law  No.  325.




Philipoine  Deconit  Insurance  Corn2oration
Origin.  and  creation:  The  PDIC  was  formally  established  in 1963,  but  was  mostly
inoperative.  The  failure  of several  uninsured  banks  in 1968  forced  the  PDIC  to
pay off depositors  even though  they  were not legally  required  to do so,  with
funds  provided  by the Central  Bank for the purpcse.  To regain  credibility,
membership  was made  compulsory  and  the  PDIC's  role  and  powers  were  expanded  in
1969.
Administration:  The  government  and  the  Central  Bank  are  represented  on  the  Board.
Until  1969  the  staff  was provided  by the  Central  Bank,  but after  that  the  PDIC
has  set  up its  own  organization.
Membership:  Voluntary  prior to 1968.  After 1968,  compulsory  for all  banking
institutions.  This includes  commercial  banks,  rural  banks,  development  banks,
savings  and  mortgage  banks,  etc.
Coverage: Coverage is extended to all deposits, including  certificates  of
deposit,  but  excluding  interbank  deposits.  After  1972,  foreign  currency  deposits
were  covered. The  maximum  coverage  was  set  at  P10,000,  and  subsequently  raised
in  steps  to.  the  current  P40,000. Insured  deposits  average  approximately  36%  of
total  deposits.
Financing:  The  capital  in  the  fund  is  brought  in  by  the  government.  Assessments
are  also  nollected  from  banks. The  maximum  level  of premiums  is 1/12  of 1%  per
annum.  Prior  to  1985,  the  PDIC  charged  only  1/18  of 1$,  and  rebated  on  a  pro  rata
basis  60%  of  the  net  assessment  income  (after  paying  claims  and  expenses)  during
the  year  to each  bank. The  other  40% is  added  to the  permanent  fund.  In 1985,
the  assessment  rate  was increased  to  the  limit.
Funds  maintained:  The  permanent  fund  was  established  with P5  million,  raised  to
P20  million  in  1973,  and  to  P2  billion  in  1985  (of  which  only  about  half  has  been
paid up).  The funds  must  be invested  in government  or government-guaranteed
securities.
Borrowing  capacity:  Originally  the PDIC was empowered  to borrow  up to P100
million  from  the  Central  Bank. The  limit  was  removed  in  1975. The  interest  rate
charged  to  the  PDIC  must  not  be less  than  the  average  paid  on government  paper.
The POIC  is also  legally  entitled  to issue  bonds  and  debentures.
Functions:  To pay off claims  for insured  deposits  in the event of a bank
failure,  and  extend  financial  assistance  to  insured  banks  to  prevent  their
closure.
Modalities  of operation:  When the Central  Bank decides  to close  a bank, it
appoints  a receiver. The  PDIC  has  up to 18 months  to pay  off depositors,  and
will try  to recover  these  funds  from  the  liquidation  proceedings. It  can  only
extend  financial  assistance  to  member  banks  for  the  purpose  of  rescue  rather  thanPage  22
prolonging  closure. Assistance  can take the form  of a loan,  a deposit,  or a
purchase  of assets.  There have apparently  been no cases of purchase and
assumption  operations  as a solution  to  problem  banks.
Supervisory  and  enforcement  powers: The  PDIC  is  empowered  to  examine  and  request
information  from  member  banks.  However,  it  has in the  past relied  on Central
Bank  examinations  of  banks. The  PDIC  can  withdraw  insurance  from  member  banks,
or impose  small  fines.
Use  of the  facility: Frcm its  inception  and  up to 1984,  94  banks  failed. Over
1984-88,  approximately  140 banks,  accounting  for 6% of total deposits,  have
failed.  The latter  string  of runs forced  the PDIC to raise  the assessm-  -
increase  the size of the fund,  and borrow  extensively  in order to cover i-
liabilities.  It is  believed  that,  if  assets  were  appropriately  valued,  the  PDIC
would  have a negative  net  worth  of about  P1 billion.
SOURCES:
Silverberg,  Stanley,  'Philippine  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation',  World Bank,
January  1989.
McCarthy,  Ian, *Deposit  Insurance:  Theory  and Practice",  IMF Central  Banking
Service,  January  1980.Appendix A
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SPI
1. DeRosit  Guarantee  Fund  (DGFl
Origins:  In  the  1960s,  banking  was  a  lethargic,  but  profitable,  industry.  Banks
operated  in  a  booming  economy  and  enjoyed  high levels  of  protection.  Entry  and
branching  were severely  controlled. Interest  rates  were regulated,  and  banks
had  to  meet  certain  credit  criteria.  Deregulation  started  in  1969,  and  proceeded
over the 1970s.  The new competitive  environment  fostered  unorthodox  banking
practices,  especially  among  the  new inexperienced  banks. Bad  practices  coupled
with the  oil-induced  recession  and  the  tight  monetary  policy  that  ensued  pushed
half  of the  existing  banks,  covering  20%  of total  deposits,  into  distress.
Creation:  DGF  was  created  in  November  1977;  it  was  restructured  and  strengthened
first  in  January  1978  and then  in  March  1980.
Administration: Initially,  the DGF  was administered  entirely  by the Central
Bank.  After March 1980,  it became  a separate  public  entity  operating  under
private  law.  It is administered  by a Board  with equal  representation  of  the
Central Bank and  the member banks, but presided over by  a Central Bank
representative.
Functions: Initially,  the  DGF  was set  up simply  to  manage  the liquidation  of
banks  and  to  pay  off  depositors.  After  January  1978,  DGF  could  grant  assistance
to  a troubled  bank  which  was not  yet  declared  insolvent,  up to an amount  equal
to the value of its insured  deposits.  On March 1980, its functions  were
strengthened  to empower  it to take  all necessary  steps  to deal with problem
banks.
Supervision  and  enforcement:  Traditionally  very  lax,  these  were  strengthened  in
the  midst  of the  banking  crisis. Supervision  became  the  responsibility  of the
Central  Bank,  not  the  DGF. After  March  1980,  DGF  can  mandate  audits  of insured
banks. The  Central  Bank  can  revoke  the  insurance  of  a  bank. A  July 1981  decree
also  empowered  the  DGF  to revoke  the  insurance  of banks  that  don't  comply  with
the  DGF's  regulations  (e.g.  on submission  of audits).
Financing:  The  DGF  was  initially  funded  by  a  one-time  assessment  of  0.1%  of  bank
deposits  and an equal contribution  from the Central  Bank.  It could revise
assessments  annually. The  fund  was  enlarged  in  March  1980. Annual  assessments
were limited  to no more that 0.1% of deposits,  and the Central Bank must
contribute  an amount  equal  to the aggregate  of the assessments. The cap on
assessments  was subsequently  raised  to  0.2% in  September  1982.
Borrowing  Capacity: On March 1980,  the Central  Bank was allowed  to grant  an
advance  equal  to  four  times  its  yearly  contribution.  After  July  1981,  the  credit
ceiling  was removed.
Membership:  Upon  creation  of  DGF,  all  private  banks,  whether  domestic  or  foreign,
automatically  became  members. However,  banks  can choose  to withdraw  from  theAppendix A
Page  24
DGF,  and  all  new  banks  must  apply  for  membership.  Non-members  cannot  obtain  any
kind  of financing  from  the  Central  Bank.
Coverage:  All deposits  of private  banks, except  for interbank  deposits  and
deposits  in  foreign  branches. Initially,  this  coverage  was  limited  to  Ptas.  0.5
million  per depositor  (in all bank accounts).  It was raised  to Ptas. 0.75
million  (in  all  accounts  in a given  bank)  in  March  1980,  and then  to Ptas.  1.5
million  in  July 1981.
Modalities  of operation:  Prior to March 1980, the DGF could only pay off
depositors  if the  Central  Bank decided  to liquidate  the  bank.  The  March 1980
decree  empowered  the  DGF  to  restructure  banks  through  the  "accordion"  mechanism.
Once an insolvency  is established  by the  Central  Bank as bank supervisor,  it
forces  the  bank to  write  off  its  losses. The  DFG  then  offers  to  buy the  bank's
shares;  if the  entire  capital  has been lost,  it  will offer  a nominal  price  of
Pta.  1  per  share. It  will  inject  as  much  capital  as  needed  strictly  to  replenish
the  resources  of the  bank - to  counter  the  writeoffs  and  any  deposit  loss. The
DGF will assume  temporary  administration  of the bank, or will relegate  the
administration  to the Banking Corporation (see below).  In either case,
management  will  be replaced  and  the  organization  and  operations  of the  bank  will
be  restructured  so  as  to  enhance  its  efficiency.  If  additional  financial  support
is -. eeded  by the bank on top of the  recapitalization,  the DGF can use other
mechanisms  such  as the  purchase  at book  value  of all  remaining  assets  that  are
non-performing  or  which have  implicit losses, concession of  guarantees,
transitory  exemption  from the  coefficient  requirements,  or granting  subsidized
loans.  The DGF must reprivatize  the bank within  a year througii  a private
offering. The DGF can take longer  to liquidate  the non-performing  or other
assets  it  purchased. The  restructuring  of the  bank is  of course  geared  towards
-iaking  it  marketable.
Tax treatment:  It is exempt  from  the  corporate  tax  and  any  indirect  taxes.
Use  of facility:  Of  the  original  51  failed  banks,  one  was  liquidated  and  26  were
restructured  and ultimately  sold to other banks by the DGF or the Banking
Corporation  (see  below).  Of the remainder,  20 belonged  to the  Rumasa  group,
which  was dealt  with  outside  the  DGF,  and four  were  absorbed  directly  by other
banks  without  the  involvement  of the  DGF.  On average,  it took  6  months  for  an
intervened  bank to be reprivatized.
Status  of the  Fund:  As of end-1985,  the  fund  was  in the  red  by  Ptas  91  billion,
and  had  been  negative  since  1983.  This  is  mostly  due  to  the  very  heavy  debt
service  burdens  on  debts  previously  incurred  with  the  Central  Bank.  In  1985
alone,  interest  paid  to  the  Central  Bank  amounted  to  Ptas  109  billion.  The  net
losses  due  to  bank  interventions  up  to  1985  amount  to  Ptas  104  billion.  The
negative  balance  of the  fund  represents  75%  of its  combined  revenues  from  bank
assessments  and  Central  Bank  contributions  over  the  period  1980-85.Page  25
2. Banking  Corooration  (RC)
Origins:  Upon  its  cre-tion,  the  DGF  had  no  powers  to  restructure  troubled  banks.
The  BC  was  created  to  assuwe  ownershlp  and  temporarily  administer  troubled  b.nks,
while  they  were  being  restructured.  When the  DGF's  powers  were  expanded  in  M&rch
1980,  many  of  the  functions  of  the  BC  were  assumed  by  the  DGF itself.  Thus,  BC
became  redundant,  and  became  merely  a  tool  of  the  DGF.
Creation:  March  1978.
Administration: Non-profit  private  corporation. Profits  in excess  of 8% of
capital  are  to  be  transferred  to  the  governsent  budget.
Function:  The  BC,  on  the  request  of  the  Central  Bank,  could  assume  temporary
ownership  and management  of a troubled  bank by the  accordion method.  Its
function  would  be  to  reprivatize  the  bank  within  a  year,  once  its  health  had  been
restored. When the  DGF's  powers  were expanded,  the  BC was used  only  when the
DGF  did  not  want to involve  itself  with the  operation  of the  bank.
Differences  with the  DGF:  (a)  the  BC does  not  deal  with  banks  in  the  process  of
liquidation;  (b)  the  BC can  only  support  problem  banks  under  its  administration
through  long-term  credit, and not through  the purchase  of the bank's non-
performing  assets.
Abolition:  BC's  activities  are  now  limited  to finishing  ur  prior  interventions,
and  is  scheduled  to  be  abolished  when  it  has  liquidated  all  its  pending  business.
Financing: The  BC,  like  the  DGF,  is funded  half  by the  private  banks  and  half
by the  Central  Bank.  It was established  with a capital  of Ptas. 500  million.
(no  mention  of annual  assessments)
SOURCES:
Larrain,  Mauricio,  and Fernando  Montes,  *The  Spanish  Deposit  Guarantee  Fund",
unpublished  manuscript,  The  World  Bank,  February  1986.
Cuervo,  Alvaro,  La Clisis  Bancaria  en Esoana  1277-1985,  Barcelona:  Ed.  Ariel,
January  1988.
Fondo  de  Garantias  de  Depositos  en  Establecimientos  Bancarios,  Kemoria
Correspondiente  al Elercielo  1983.  1985.
McCarthy,  Ian,  Deposit  Insurance:  Theory  and  PracticeO,  IMF Staff  Paners,  Vol.
27  No.3,  September  1980.
Pecchioli,  R.  M., Prudential  Socrvision in Banking,  OECD,  1987.Aoppendix  A
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TEILAND
Fund  for  the  Rehabilitation  and  Develo9ment  of Financial  Institutions  (RF)
***  NOTE:  This  is an  mlaicit  deposit  protection  scheme.
Origins:  Thailand faced a severe financial  crisis in early 1980s, as poor
managerial  practices  and inadequate  regulation/supervision  was compounded  by
recession.  Beginning  in 1983, about 5 commercial  banks and 50 finance  and
security  companies (together  eccoxuting  for 25% of banking assets)  were in
trouble  and  eventually  had to be intervened.
Creation:  1985.
Administration:  Legally  distinct  entity  from the  Central  Bank,  possessing  its
own  Board  and  management.
Functions:  To .zabilitate financial  institutions.  It operates  as a 'hospital
bank  along  t;' Spanish  model. Unlike  most  deposit  insurance  corporations,  tho
RF plays  no role  in  bank liquidations.
Modalities  of  operation:  Provide  support  to  troubled  institutions  by lending  to,
placing  deposits  in,  acquiring  assets  from,  a;A  underwriting  or holding  equity
in  financial  institutions.  Thus,  it  can  inject  liquidity  and/or  new  capital  to
banks.
Relationship  with Central  Bank interventions:  The Central  Bank  can also grant
-soft  loans"  to ailing  institutions,  and can set  financial  programs  requiring
banks to reduce  their  present  capital,  achieve  certain  new capital  levels,  or
replace  management. However,  it cannot  take  equity  participations  -- this is
the  main  distinguishing  feature  with  the  RF. All  actions  on  ailing  institutions
are  initiated  by the  Central  Bank.
Financing:  Banks  are required  to make contributions  up to 0.5%  of outstanding
deposits;  currently  the  rate  is  set  at  0.1%. It  has  also  received  major  funding
from  the  Central  Bank through  a  capital  subscription  and  loans. As of November
1988,  the  fund  had B12.2  billion,  of  which  84%  was  put in  by the  Central  Bank.
Supervision  and  enforcement  powers:  These  lie  entirely  with the  Central  Bank.
The RF can enforce  its actions through  the ownership  of equity  rather than
through  supervision.
Use of facility:  By November  1988,  had lent  B4.2  billion  and  purchased  equity
worth  35.3 billion.  In all, 5 banks have received  financial  assistance. A
number  of schemes  have  been  applied  in these  cases,  as different  modalities  of
operation  were used in  each.
SOURCES:
IHF, "Distressed  Flnancial  Institutions  in Thailand:  Structural  Weaknesses,Page  27
Support  Operations  and  Economic Consequences,"  January  1989.
World Bank,  Roport  No.  7445-TH.
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I.  The  Bak  Liquidation  Fund  (BLFi
Origins:  Prior to 1944, Turkey had a  State banking system.  In 1944, a
liberalization  program was  introduced,  under  which  private banking was
encouraged.  Three  private  banks  were created  in the  next four  years,  and  they
flourished  in the new liberalized  environment. But in the 1950s six banks
collapsed.
Creation:  1960.
Functions: Strictly  paying  off  depositors  of foiled  banks.
Modalities  of Operation:  The Ministry  of Finance  decides  on the closure  of
banks. The  management  of the  liquidation  process  is  handled  by another  bank  by
appointment  from the  Ministry  of Finance.  BLF reimburses  the liquidator  for
operating  expenditures  and  to  cover  the  excess  of liabilities  over  assets.
Administration:  Administration  is by  the Central Bank, but decisions on
liquidation  are taken  by the  Ministry  of Finance.
Coverage:  BLF provided  100% insurance  to all depositors  and other general
creditors. Only shareholdets  are  left  out.
Financing:  The fund  was fed  with  a one-time  premium  of 0.05S  of commercial  and
savings  deposits  (note  - that's  not all  of liabilities  insured). In practice
the  fund  was empty.  In case of bank failure,  the  BLF  would use Central  Bank
credit,  which  would  then  be paid  off  with  ex-post  assessments.
Membership:  compulsory.
Supervision  and  enforcement  powers:  none.
Use of facility: The  Fund  was  originally  used  to deal  with the  six  banks  that
failed  prior to its own creation.  A total of TL 351.7 million  were paid
initially  with Central  Bank  credit. It took  until  1978 to repay  these  debts,
so  that  the  Fund  was  actually  negative  for  a long  time  in  spite  of the  fact  that
there  were  no new bank failures  between  1960  and  1983.
II.  The Savings  Denosit  Insurance  Fund  (SDIF)
Origins:  The banking sector  was flourishing  in the 1970s.  The economy  was
growing,  and flxed  interest  rates  in the  face  of  high inflation  created  profit
opportunities  for  banks.  But a stabilization  program  in January  1980 created
variable  interest  rates,  which consequently  rose  dramatically. Many banks'ARPendix  A
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condition  became  precarious  by 1983,  and  several  banks  threatened  to fail. The
collapse  of a dubious  scheme  by a  money  broker  had severe  repercussions.
Creation:  July 23,  1983. The  BLF  was transferred  to the  SDIF.
Functions:  To provide assistance  to banks in receivership,  and to pay off
depositors  if the  bank is liquidated.  However, it is the  Ministry  of Finance
who decides on the actions to be taken,  and appoints  receivers  to either
restructure  or liquidate  the  bank.
Modalities  of  operation: In  case  of  restructuring,  the  Ministry  of Finance  can
request  that  the  SDIF  purchase  part  or all  of the  assets  of the  rroblem  bank  to
strengthen  its liquidity.  In case the bank is merged, the SDIF will be
instructed  to  provide  direct  financial  assistance  to  the  acquiring  bank. If  the
bank is to be liquidated,  the SDIF will pay off the depositors  by opening
accounts  on other  banks in  the  name of  each  depositor  up to the  insured  limit.
The  SDIF  then  becomes  a  preferential  creditor  in the  bankruptcy  proceedings.
Administration:  By the Central  bank.  All administrative  decisions  must be
approved  by the  Central  Bank,  and  the  head  of the  SDIF is the  Governor  of the
Central  Bank.  Some decisions  (e.g.  rate, method  and time of collection  of
assessments)  must  be taken  by the  Council  of  Ministers  upon  the  proposal  of the
Ministry.
Membership:  Compulsory  for  all  domestic  or foreign  banks.
Coverage:  All  non-commercial  deposits,  both resident and non-resident,  in
domestic  or  foreign  banks,  up  to  TL  3  million  per  person  in  each  bank. Interbank
deposits  and  the  deposits  at  branches  abroad  are  not  covered. The  deposits  of
the  bank's  major  shareholders  and  managers  are  not insured.
Financing:  Premiums  levied  on  member  banks,  amounting  to  0.3%  of  insured  deposits
at year end.  Premiums  on foreign  currency  accounts  are  collected  in the  same
denomination.  The  SDIF  can  also  use  the  resources  collected  from  miscellaneous
fines  and  unclaimed  deposits  in  member  banks,  the  resources  transferred  from  the
BLF,  and  the  revenues  from  its  assets.
Tax treatment:  The Fund  is  not  subject  to taxes. Also,  premiums  paid  by banks
are  tax-deductible.
Borrowing  capacity:  The Central  Bank can provide  credit  to,  the SDIF,  at the
request  of the  Ministry  of Finance,  who will decide  on the  amount,  terms  and
other  conditions  of that  advance.
Supervision  and  enforcement  powers:  none (done  by the  Ministry  of Finance).
Main  differences  with  BLF:  Collects  higher  premium  income. The  use  of its  funds
is wider,  not just for  paying  off depositors  in case of liquidation. But it
still  has no powers  to deal  with problem  banks itself  or to supervise  banks.
It is severely  handicapped  by legal  constraints  and lack  of adequate  autonomy.pLendix A
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Use  of facility:  As of  October  1987,  two  banks  had  been  liquidated  and  the  SDIF
paid  off  their  depositors,  three  failed  banks  were  merged  into  the  Agricultural
Bank,  and  two  more  were  belng  supported  by loan made  by the  SDIF - all  in  1984.
SOURCES:
Erol,  Cengiz  and Eugene  Sauls,  'The  History  of DeposLt  Insurance  in Turkey",
Middle  East  Business  and  Banking,  3:20-22,  July 1984.
McCarthy,  Ian,  Deposit  Insurance:  Theory  and Practice*,  IMF Central  Banking
Service,  January  1980.
Pecchioli,  R. M.,  Prudential  SuRervision  in Banking,  OECD.  1987.
Banks  Association  of Turkey,  Banks  Act, Part  10:  SDIF,  February  1986.
President's  Report  on the  Second  FSAL  to  Turkey,  The  World  Bank,  April  1988.ARRendix  A
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DeRosit  Guarantee  Fund (FOGADE)
Precursor:  An  early  deposit  insurance  scheme  was  limited  to  institutions  in  the
Savings  and Loan System  ascribed  to the National  S&L Bank.  In this scheme,
coverage  was  up to  Bs 500,000  and  member  banks  paid an annual  premium  of 0.10%
of total  deposits  annually  (which  could  be raised  to  0.25%).
Origins:  FOGADE  came in the  wake of a bank failure  (Banco  de Comercio)  that
patently  showed  the inability  of currently  existing  institutions  to deal.  with
banking  crises. The  bank failure  was allowed  to fester,  and  at one  point  this
one  bank  was the  recipient  of about  48%  of total  Central  Bank  rediscounts.
Creation: March  1985.
Administration:  Legally separate entity from the  Central Bank  and  the
Superintendency  of Banks.  Reports  to the  Government  through  the Ministry  of
Finance.
Membership:  Compulsory  for  all  formal  banks  and  credit  institutions.  Membership
requires  external  audits  of each  institution  every  six  months.
Coverage: All  types  of deposits  are  covered,  but  not  money  market  funds. The
maximum coverage  currently  stands at Bs 250,000  per depositor,  but can be
increased  up to  Bs 500,000  subject  to the  approval  of the  National  Executive.
Financing: There are two assessments  annually  based on the  volume of total
deposits, The  premium  currently  stands  at 0.16%  but is scheduled  to increase
up  to  0.25%  by  January  1990. An initial  capital  contribution  from  the  Government
was  envisioned,  but none  has  been  made so far.
Borrowing  Capacity: FOGADE  started  off  with  a line  of credit  from  the  Central
Bank of Bs 5 billion,  but has up to present  been extended  to Bs 11 billion.
Such  credit  has a 5  year  maturity,  but  can  be rolled  over.
Functions:  To guarantee  public  deposits,  to facilitate  the intervention  of
banks,  and  to  provide  financial  support  to troubled  banks  prior  to intervention
when such  support  would  help to  preserve  financial  stability. Therefore,  its
function  is  quite  broad.
Modalities  of Operation: The FOGADE  is authorized  to:  (a)  grant  credits  of
maturLties  of up to 10 years  backed  by any asset  and with the  possibility  of
subsidization;  (b)  to  acquire  and  subscribe  shares  of  banks;  (e)  to  purchase  any
assets  from  banks. These  it  can  do  in  the  favor  of  private  or  intervened  banks,
and  does not  require changing bank  management or  wiping  out  existing
shareholders.  In  case  of intervention,  it is  the  Superintendency,  not  FOGADE,
that  acts as receiver. FOGADE  itself  cannot  single-handedly  liquidate  banks,
lntervene  In  banks  or replace  management.A22efndix  A
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Supervisory  and  Enforcement  Powers:  Supervision  is  split  up  into  a  number  of
Superintendencies  (for  Banks,  S&Ls,  insurance  companies,  etc.).  The
Superintendent  has the power to force changes in bank, intervene in them,
penalize  then for non-compliance  with regulations,  etc.  In some cases,  the
Siperintendency  must  act  in  consultation with  FOGADE, but  it  is  the
Superintendent  that initiates  and carries through  any actions.  FOGADE  has
developed  its  own  bank  analysis  capability.
Use  of the  Facility: Upon its  creation  the  Central  Bank  transferred  to FOGADE
all the  assets  acquired  through  intervention  in the  previous  10 years.  Asset
recovery  is  sub-contracted  by FOGADE. Several  of its  recent  actions  have made
apparent  that FOGADE is harmed  by its insufficient  human resources,  lack of
decision-making  power,  poor  coordination  with other  banking  oversight  agencies
like the  Central  Bank  and the  Superintendency,  inadequate  capitalization,  and
vulnerability  to political  pressures. Aside from dealing  with the Banco de
Comercio  which  failed  prior  to  FOGADE's  coming  into  being,  FOGADE  has  been  called
upon to liquidate  two small  finance  companies  through  depositor  payoff, has
assisted two  mortgage banks,  and  supported one  commercial bank.  The
Superintendency  has intervened  in at least  4 other  commercial  banks,  without
FOGADE's  involvement.
SOURCES:
Background  paper  for  OLatin  America's  Financial  Systems  in  the  1980s: a Cross-
Country  Comparison,"  LATTF,  June 1989.
'Latin  America's  Financial  Systems  in the  1980s: a Cross-Country  Comparison,"
LATTF,  June 1989.
Gutierrez,  Joaquin, 'Prudential  Regulation  and  Banking Supervision:  The
Venezuelan  Institutional  Framework, August  1989.Annendix  A
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Unconditional  Government  Guarantee
It its  unclear when the governrent  first committed itself to guaranteeing
deposits. The commitment  appears  in the  1985  and draft  1988  laws regulating,
respectively,  the  princlples  of the  banking  and  credit  system  and the  National
Bank  of Yugoslavia.
According  to the 1985 law, the legal guarantor  depends  on the nature  of the
deposits. The  National  Bank  guarantees  domestic  currency  savings  deposits  held
by basic  banks,  the Post  Office  Savings  Bank,  and savings  banks;  the federal
government  guarantees  foreign  currency  deposits  held by private  citizens  and
foreigners;  and autonomous  republics  or provinces  may extend gmarantees  on
domestic  currency  savings  accounts  held  at other  financial  institutions.
According  to the  1988  draft  law,  the  National  Bank is  the  only legal  guarantor
for all financial  institutions.  However,  coverage is limited to domestic
currency  savings  deposits  held  by individuals.
SOURCES:
Ognjanovic,  Vuk,  The  Banking  and  Credit  System  in  Yugoslavia,  Belgrade,  1986.
Draft  of  the  Law  on the  National  Bank  of  Yugoslavia  and  of  the  Bank  Law,  October
1988.Appendix  B
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Country  Oank  Asesmnts  Govt. Contributions  I  Fund  Borrowing
Dates  | Rate  Be"s  Initial  Regular  lIafntained  Authority  I Comments
.......  *-  I  I…  …....I…-------  -- …-----  ---  - ---------  I--------
Switzerland  none  none  I  noe  none  I  no  none  IPrivate  agreement  asong  banks for
1984-  I  I  Imutual  insurance.
Turkey  one-time  commercial  nore  none  r  yes  unlimited  lif  claims  exceed  size  of  furd.  borrow  from
1960-83  U  preelue & saving  p  |  ICentrol  Bank nd  repay with  exp.st  assessments.
10.051;also  deposits  I  I
I  ox-post.  u(insured)  I  I
II  I  I
Turkey  0  03X/a  year-end  none  none  I  yes  unlimited  lAlso  finaoced from funds  transferred  from
1983-  i  Insured dep.  I  I  earlier  furd  nd  iunclaimed  deposits.
I  ~~~~~~I  I  I
UK  jLevies  proportional  to  I  none  none  I  yes
1982-  Ideposits,  botween  2500-1  I
I300000  not  to  exceed  I  I  I
10.3X  of  deposit  be  e  I
I  I  'I  I
US  11/12*fl1/a  aw. total  I  no  none  I  yes  up  to  S3b  lAssessment  rate  varied  to  keep fid between  1.1
1933-  deposits  |  |  land 1.4X of  total  Insured  deposits;  6OX  of  net
lincome of  FDIC to  be credited  to  banks  against
I  I  l  Ifuture  assessments.
Yugosloavis  no bank assessments  |  none  as  needed  to  j  no  not  necessary |
1985-  I  I  cover  cletmAppendix  B
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1979-  |  Institutions  ter,  COs.  since '88  ireiubursed  for  those  over  tilt.
I  I  I
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195-  I  savings  inst.  Icash  certificates  If  fund  is  iright  to  pay  ent.
I  I  large  enoughi
I  I  I
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I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I  I
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